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The Government of National Unity, on coming into power in April, 1994, has endorsed
the reconstruction and development programme (RDP) and its broad agenda for the
rapid removal of the problems and gross inequality evident in all aspects of the South
African society. Many economists argue that the sustain ability of the RDP, will
depend crucially on the maintenance of fiscal discipline and the progressive reduction
of the overall fiscal deficit. As excessive fiscal deficits are often associated with higher
inflation, higher real interest rates, balance of payments disequilibrium and lower
economic growth, thereby putting the RDP at jeopardy. The view based on the
Ricardian Equivalence approach however, takes the position that neither deficits nor
the way they are financed, is as critical to economic policy and the future prosperity
of an economy, as is generally believed. The Ricardian view consequently, argues
that government need not necessarily embark on deficit reduction programmes as
advocated by the so called traditional view.
The study investigates the validity of the Ricardian view, both on the empirical and
theoretical side, with special ret u:encelo the SouttLAfr' economy. The specific-- - - ----
question that this study attempts to address is whether economic agents behave in
a Ricardian manner in the South African economy. Our results (based on the
replication of the Dalamagas (1994) study) could be very consequential for South
African policy makers, as they suggest that the Ricardian Equivalence proposition is
valid and therefore, government could on purely theoretical grounds shift its focus
away from the debt situation, and concentrate on the policies aimed to correct the
inequalities (in wealth, distribution of public goods, employment opportunities) created
by the Apartheid era. Whether government should do so in reaHt howeve~ is
debateable due to the other considerations that government need to take account of





Until the 1980's, budget deficits were not generally considered as grounds for serious
concem by economists and policy makers alike and, in accordance with this attitude,
many countries were not concerned about running deficits of about 4-6% of GDP.
HOVJever, more recently, this complacent attitude towards budget deficits has changed
dramatically, and economists now tend to place great significance on the possible
negative economic consequences of increased public debt, which include poor
investment performance, low employment levels, high inflation, poor economic growth
and balance of payments problems. There has, subsequently been a worldwide trend
towards the lowering of fiscal deficits in the '1990's. In particular, fiscal deficits have
received much of the blame for the various problems (which include over-
indebtedness and the debt crisis, high inflation and poor investment growth and
perfonnance) that have beset many developing countries in the 1980's. Consequently,
developing economies regard deficit reduction programmes an issue of great urgency.
South Africa, despite its high debt situation, is only just beg1nning to follow this
'NOrldwide trend of deficit reduction. South Africa's deficit increased rapidly during the
early 1990's to a high of 8% of GDP in 1992 and, present figures are still considered
to be high by world standards .
Attempting to balance the budget (given that a budget deficit (or surplus) is a function
of the tax rate, national income and the level of government expenditure in the
economy) necessitates that there is either a lowering of govemment expenditure
(which is often a burdensome and distressing process, as it often requires,that
government cuts expenditure on important social programs) or a rise in taxation
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(which can negatively affect work incentives and investment, or both).
Given this predicament, it is extremely important that the South African government
takes careful consideration of the options available to it, before embarking on the
difficult process of deficit reduction. This appraisal, of the current debt situation in
South Africa, and vklat should be done about it - if anything - requires an in-depth and
critical evaluation of the contemporary theories and empirical evidence about the
economic consequences of budget deficits on economies.
The generally held view that persistent budget deficits will have harmful effects on
economic performance, are based on the so called traditional approach to budget
deficits, which maintains that high interest rates, lower levels of national saving and
slow economic growth will be associated with persistent budget deficits. The Ricardian
view however, adopts the position that neither deficits nor the way they are financed,
is as critical (in fact, they argue that it is completely inconsequential) to economic
policy and the future prosperity of an economy, as is generally believed.
1.2 Objectives of this st~
Initially, my objective is to provide an overvi,ew of the approaches to the economic
consequences of budget deficits. The Ricardian view is then critically evaluated, both
on the theoretical and empirical side. Then, Basil Dalamagas' (1994) consumption
function study, which incorporates the South African economy as a sample cou'ntry,
is analysed in detail, and is then, replicated so as to reaffirm or reject his unexpected
finding that, economic agents appear to behave in a Ricardian manner in the South
African economy. Given the findings of this investigation, conclusions are drawn as
to what possible form South Africa's future macroeconomic policy should take.
1.3 Me.tbQd
The key question this dissertation attempts to answer is - Do economic agents behave
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in a Ricardian manner in the South African economy? This question is answered via
the replication of the Dalamagas (1994) consumption function study. This framework
is chosen as Dalamagas estimates (unlike many other studies that have been
undertaken) that there is considerable evidence in support of the Ricardian view. He
finds for instance, that consumers in the South African economy tend to discount the
higher future tax liabilities implied by a current debt for tax swop, which is very
con'sequential as it suggests that public debt (in the context of a debt for tax swop) will
be absorbed in the economy without any effect on real economic variables. The
Dalamagas results are so unexpected and surprising, as they are in complete conflict
with the generally held view that persistent budget deficits have a negative impact on
economic performance, that they prompt the researcher to replicate his study so as
to provide further authentication to his claims. Dewald et al (1986) investigate the role
of replication in empirical economic research, and find that despite its unpopularity,
it is an essential component of the scientific methodology. Dewald et al (p. 600)
concluded that - 'only through the replication of the results of others can scientists
unify the disparate findings of various researchers in a discipline into a defensible,
consistent, coherent body of knowledge'. So despite, the unconventional format
chosen in this thesis, the Dewald et al study illustrates that replication is indeed a
valid alternative to the conventional methodology of original economic research
(which involves theory, data collection and empirical analysis).
1.4 Organisation
This study is organised as follows: following the introduction in chapter one, in chapter
two the contemporary viev.lS, the Keynesian approach and the approach based on the
Ricardian Equivalence, about the impact of budget deficits on economies, are
introduced (in simplified form) with an emphasis on their similarities and differences.
In Chapter three, Robert Barro's (1974) model of the Ricardian Equivalence approach
is closely examined, a~d the debates surrounding the assumptions required by the
Ricardian Equivalence approach are also appraised. In Chapter four, the empirical
(both the indirect and direct) evidence is evaluated, with an emphasis on what
implications the results may have on the validity of the Ricardian Equivalence
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approach. In Chapter five, Basil Dalamagas' (1994) consumption function study is
surveyed. This study places special emphasis on how one can account for and
interpret the divergent empirical evidence on the validity of the Ricardian Equivalence
approach which is often found in studies focusing specifically on developed or less
developed economies. In Chapter six, a review of the trends (the period 1973 to 1992)
in South Africa's own debt situation is made. In Chapter seven, Basil Dalamagas·
(1994) model is replicated using South African data specifically. Dalamagas' results,
and their implications for South Africa's future fiscal policy, are so astounding that
they require additional validation. To this end this thesis replicates the Oalamagas
(1994) study so as to provide further substantiation or refutation to his claims. The
results of the replication of Dalamagas' study and the discussion on them are





!HE APPROACHES TO BUDGET DEFICITS
There have been numerous theoretical attempts to explain and understand the
economic consequences of budget deficits, and these theories attempt to address the
important practical and theoretical question - Are budget deficits a cause for
concern? Persistent budget deficits in the economies of the world have raised the
interest of economists and policy makers in the theories about the potency and
potential negative effects of expansionary fiscal policy. The main approaches that
have emerged from this concern have been the Keynesian approach and the
approach based on the Ricardian Equivalence.
Deficit Financing. Before looking at the various theoretical approaches, the simple
question of why deficit financing take place needs to be addressed. Should a country
opt to reduce taxes and does not reduce public expenditure accordingly, it will run a
budget deficit. In such a situation a government has two domestic financing options
available to it. It can either finance the deficit by increased money creation
(seigniorage), or by the issue of public debt via the sale of government bonds. The
preferred option is the latter method, as increased money creation is widely
considered highly inflationary1 and, therefore, is regarded as an undesirable method
of financing the budget deficit. There is however, a problem also associated with the
1 The creation of money is generally regarded as inflationary as most
economists (monetarists, in particular) believe that if money is printed at
a rate that is in excess of the demand for it, at the current price level,
there will be excess cash balances in the hands of the public. When the
public reduces these cash balances this will drive up the price level until
equilibrium is restored, thus inducing inflation.
6
sale of government bonds which is that bonds are interest-bearing. This is an
important concern as it highlights the point that when opting for this financing method
government must realise (and take account) of the fact that, in addition to having to
repay the principal on the bonds at their maturity date, they will also be obligated to
pay the bearers of those bonds interest OVE~r each period that the bonds are held2.
2.2 The Keynesian Approach
The so called traditional view of budget deficits, which is usually identified with the
Keynesian approach, proposes that if the government is running a bond-financed
budget deficit, the sale of government bonds to the private sector will tend to result
in an increase in the perceived 'net wealth' of the private sector3. They argue that a
fraction of this extra disposable income (made available by a bond-financed budget
deficit) will be saved by the private sector, the exact amount of which will depend on
the current marginal propensity to save. The critical suggestion however, of the
Keynesian view is that the increase in privatl9 saving will be less than the tax cut. This
will be so because, the tax cut will be perceived as an increase in net wealth and
economic agents will also tend to increase their planned consumption expenditure in
line with the increase in their net wealth. RE~membering that there will be a decline in
public sector saving (as government has run a budget deficit), national savings
(private saving plus public saving) will decline accordingly. In order for the investment-
savings balance to return to its initial level, interest rates will have to rise and, this will
tend to 'crowd-out' investment, which wiU in the long run result in a smaller stock of
productive capital (Barro, 1989). The decline in the stock of productive capital is very
2
3
The interest paid by govemment to govemment bond holders can be
thought of as a remuneration for the provision of a 'service'. In this
context liquidity is the service provided by bond holders to government
and therefore, government is obliged to pay for this service.
Keynesians believe this is the case since, at the time the government
issues bonds private assets rise, but the private sector perceives no
matching increase in private liabilities, it has therefore been argued that
in such a situation individuals will rationally view the issue of government
bonds as an increase in their net worth.
LMl
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consequential in the evaluation of the economic impact of budget deficits on
economies, as it implies that there is a 'burden' on future generations4 associated with
an increase in public debt via the sale of government bonds. Evidently, the question
of'M1ether additional public expenditure should be financed by an increase in current
taxes or by a bond-financed budget deficit is extremely consequential.
The Keynesian Approach and its expectations about the consequences of bond-
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Figure 1 The Keynesian approach using the IS-LM model
Figure 1 - graphically illustrates the Keynesian view, which maintains that increasing
the budget deficit causes the initial equilibrium output (Y1) to expand to et ), as
economic agents view the increased disposable income made available by the budget
This is so as, in a closed economy, budget deficits are seen to retard
domestic capital formation and shift the economy to a growth path with a
lower per capita output and capital per worker.
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deficit as an addition to net wealth, this expansion of output raises the demand for
money, if the money supply is assumed fixed (that is, the deficit is financed via the
sale of bonds), the interest rate (r) must rise to restore the investment/savings ratio
as there is an increase in credit demand (this is shown by equilibrium B, where r1 <
r2). Private investment will fall (this is the 'crowding-out' effect) due to the higher
domestic interest rate. This in turn reduces the initial impact on output, Y2 > Y3 (as
shown by equilibrium B), and the full Keynesian multiplier effect (as shown by point
C) is offset by the increase in the interest rate (r1 < f2). The critical point to make
however, is that the higher domestic interest rates will tend to dampen the interest
sensitive components of demand which win lower the level of productive investment,
leading to a lower level of capital accumulation, and thus result in a lower stock of
productive capital available to future generations.
Eisner (1989) a supporter of Keynesian theory, argues that deficits need not
completely 'crowd out' private investment, as the increased aggregate demand
enhances the profitability of private investments, and this will tend to lead to higher
levels of investment at any given rate of interest. Thus, according to Eisner deficits
actually stimulate aggregate saving and investment, despite the fact that they may
raise interest rates. Eisner argues that in such circumstances increased consumption
is supplied from previously under utilized resources. Consequently, Eisner argues that
appropriately timed deficits tend to have beneficial consequences (higher private
investment and saving), despite the higher interest rates associated with them.
This type of Keynesian analysis will apply only in closed economies, or in open
economies that are sufficiently large enough to influence world markets. In a small
opens economy however, vvhere domestic rates are linked to vvorld interest rates, a
country's decision to run a bond-financed budget deficit will usually result in increased
borrowing from other countries, as the increased deficit on the domestic credit market
will tend to lead the private sector to borrow more from abroad where it can obtain
5 If there is a worldwide tendency towards budget deficits, the effect for a
small economy will be the same as that for a closed economy, with
investment being cro\tVded out in each country.
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loans more cheaply, which will lead to a deficit on the current account, rather than to
higher domestic interest rates (Barro, 1989). Although productive investment is
maintained (as interest rates have not increased), the country's future prosperity
declines because the current account deficit means that there is a lower stock of
national vvealth and an increased external debt-servicing requirement. Consequently,
budget deficits are also deemed undesirable in such circumstances.
South Africa over the past two decades has had a relatively closed economy (due in
part to sanctions levied over part of this period), and hence, most of South Africa's
debt has remained within the country. The Keynesian approach, 'WOuld therefore
predict that higher domestic interest rates are likely to be a consequence of bond..
financed budget deficits.
An evaluation of the Keynesian approach
Although Keynesian theory is the preferred view, and dominates the field of the
investigation into the economic consequences of budget deficits on economies,
Keynesian theory has not been embraced by all economists. Some economists have
criticised Keynesian theory on various grounds, and these criticisms can be grouped
into five main categories.
i.) Underemployed resources. Most authors commend Keynesian theory for
highlighting the importance of the existence of underemployed resources when
evaluating the impact of budget deficits on consumption and wealth. Should
unemployed resources exist, the increase in aggregate demand does not imply that
investment will be 'fully' crowded out by increased interest rates (as argued by the
Neoclassical approach), and the economy can consequently move to a higher
equilibrium level of output. They do, however, criticise the Keynesians for not having
formulated a satisfactory theory that accounts for the presence of unemployment (and
underemployed resources) in an economy (Bernheim, 1989 p. 60). The Keynesians
do, however, show that the economy can be in equilibrium at less than full
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employment due to deficiencies in demand. Eisner (1989), a supporter of Keynesian
theory rejects this criticism, as he believes it attempts to create a standard which no
theory could reasonably comply with, as a particular theory only focuses on certain
features of the real 'NOrld as opposed to the 'NOrld in its entirety.
ii.) 'Fine-tuning' the economy. The Keynesian approach presupposes that
govemment can and will effectively 'fine tune' the economy using deficit-causing fiscal
pol icies as a stimulus to economic activity. The criticism here, is that the use of
effective 'fine tuning' policies by policy makers is unlikely to occur in reality, due to the
inherent inefficiency of the political decision making process (Bernheim, 1989 p. 61).
iii.) Temporary budget deficits. Another criticism pointed out by critics of Keynesian
theory is that it primarily describes the effects of temporary budget deficits and not
permanent deficits, and by not making this distinction tends to provide policy makers
with misleading advice (Bernheim, 1989 p. 61).
iv.) Liquidity constrained or myopic economic agents. Bernheim (1989 p. 56 )
argues that Keynesian results depend on a significant number of economic agents
being myopic or liquidity constrained, and should this not be the case in reality, the
Keynesian approach \\'Quid clearly fail6. lEisner (1989 p. 74), however, argues that
economic agents are not necessarily myopic if they increase consumption in the face
of increases in current disposable income and continue to increase it if there is a high
possibility of continuing deficits. In such circumstances, the rise expected in
disposable income (in line with the increases in public debt) should (rationally) be
perceived as net wealth. Therefore, Eisner argues that the Keynesian approach will
still hold in an economy where a large percentage of the population is not myopic.
v.) The 'balanced-budget'. Critics of Keynesian theory believe that Keynesians have
promoted a major fallacy in the deficit debate. The fallacy being that a 'balanced
6 Thi~ issue will be discussed in greater detail in the next section 2.3, as
this criticism forms the basis of the Ricardian view.
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budget' has some special significance. Critics point out that Keynesians argue as if
deficits are expansionary and surpluses are contractionary, whereas empirical
evidence (for example, Kotlikoff (1988) vvho found no such relationship existed) has
not supported such claims. Therefore, critics argue that Keynesian theory does not
accurately reflect the impact of bond-financed deficits on the economy
(Bernheim, 1989).
2.3 The Ricardian Equivalence Approach
The Ricardian view (the Ricardian Equivalence approach) of the consequences of
budget deficits originated from the work of a 19th century economist, Oavid Ricardo.
The theory introduced by Ricardo was that the two primary methods of financing a
given path of govemment expenditure - those being increased current taxation or the
creation of public debt via the sale of government bonds - will have an 'equivalent'
impact on the economy. He continued to say that in the real world economic agents
may suffer from 'fiscal illusion' and, in such circumstances his theory would not hold.
Ricardo believed that should economic agents be suffering from 'fiscal illusion' the
issue of public debt via the sale of government bonds will delude economic agents
into thinking they are wealthier than is actually the case, as they are not able to
correctly evaluate the true economic consequences of the debt, due in many
instances to the considerable costs involved in obtaining the relevant information
which would allow them to accurately determine their real individual tax burden.
Consequently, in the case of a bond-financed budget deficit, if economic agents are
suffering from 'fiscal illusion', they will not correctly perceive the increased future tax
liability implied by the current debt for tax swop and, will therefore, increase their
consumption in accordance with the increase in their perceived net wealth. Financing
higher govemment expenditure via increased current taxation would not result in this
'deceiving' effect (O'Oriscoll, 1977).
In 1974, Robert Barro reintroduced Ricardo's theory in his seminal paper entitled 'Are
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Government Bonds Net Wealth?'. In this paper7 Barro put forward his belief that the
Ricardian Equivalence approach did in fact accurately reflect the impact of bond-
financed budget deficits on economies, as he believed Ricardo had overestimated the
importance of 'fiscal illusion' as an impediment to the operation of the Ricardian
Equivalence. This re-emergence of Ricardo's theory was influential and it renewed the
debate over the impact of budget deficits on private consumption and 'Health.
An intuitive understanding of the Ricardian Equivalence approach
According to the Ricardian Equivalence approach, deficits have no effect on current
consumption because rational economic agents (unlike Keynesian theory, economic
agents are viewed as being rational and not myopic) base their consumption
decisions on lifetime income8, which depends on the present value of government
expenditures, and not on ~he timing of the tax collections. Consequently, the Ricardian
Equivalence approach maintains that economic agents will save more, Rand for Rand,
to pay for the higher future tax liabilities implied by the current bond-financed budget
deficit. This is so because, according to the supporters of Ricardian Equivalence
approach, the traditional view ignores the intertemporal budget constraint of the
government, which requires that the difference be!'Neen the present value of all
expected taxation in the future, and the present value of the path of government
expenditures should be equal to the current stock of government debt. Therefore, the
Ricardian Equivalence approach maintains that any increase in the current stock of
government debt will, for a given path of future government expenditures, require an
increase in taxes in the future for the servicing and retirement of the additional debt
incurred today. An increase in current government debt, therefore, represents merely
a shift in the timing of taxation from the current period to a period in the future.
Consequently, the Ricardian view argues that the future tax implications inherent in
7
8
This paper will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.
Or permanent income.
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the current debt for tax S'NOP will be 'fully' perceived by the private sector, and current
saving will be increased to allow for the higher anticipated future taxation. These
higher savings will often take the form of bequests to future generations. The amount
of such bequests will be that future generations will be able to meet the higher future
tax liabilities implied by the current debt for tax swop. Increased desired private
consumption (which is induced by the increase in disposable income made available
by the debt for tax S'AUp), will decrease by the full extent of the increase in public debt,
leaving aggregate demand unaffected. The Ricardian view therefore, concludes that
public debt (in the context of a debt for tax svvop) will be absorbed in the economy
without any effect on real economic variables.
The logic behind the Ricardian Equivalence approach is best illustrated using a
mathematical model, Barro's (1993) provides a fitting example of such a model.
A model illustrating the Ricardian Equivalence approach
Barro (1993) illustrates how the approach based on the Ricardian Equivalence
functions using a simple, well-specified model9 . In the model, he highlights the
Ricardian Equivalence approach by isolating the effect that running a deficit would
have on the present value of real taxes. In order to isolate this effect Barro (1993) had
to make a number of critical (and often controversial) assumptions: - Barro assumes
that economic agents are rational, 'forward-looking' and do not perceive government
bonds as 'net wealth'. In addition, he assumes the following:
(i) All bonds have a maturity date of one period.
(ii) Capital markets are perfect.
(iii) Taxes are lump-sum.
Barro assumes that the government budget constraint (which requires that
expenditure (payments) cannot exceed revenue (funds)) for period t is:




Pt =the price level,
Gt =real government purchases,
Vt =transfers,
rt =the rate of interest,
Bt =the debt issue,
Tt =taxes,
Mt =money supply.
Consequently, according to this budget constraint (equation 1) - government
expenditures (purchases, transfers and interest payments on the pervious periods
bond issues) are financed by tax receipts, money creation and the net debt issue in
period t.
In order to further simplify his analysis Barro makes the following additional
assumptions (the impact of these to the overall accuracy of his conclusions will be
discussed latter in this section) :-
(i) Aggregate transfers are zero in each period.
(ii) The price level and aggregate money stock do not change over time.
(iii) The value of real government purchases is given for each period.
Given these assumptions the real government bUdget constraint (after recognising
that prices are not changing) takes the following form:
r.Bt-1 Tt Bt-Bt-1G--=-+--
t P P P
(2)
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Barro having made the above assumptions, which allow for the isolation of the
Ricardian Equivalence, continues to demonstrate the operation of the 'neutral' effect
of new or increased government debt on real variables in an economy.
To illustrate the Ricardian Equivalence approach, Barro proposes the following
scenario, firstly - that at the end of period t=O the government has no interest bearing
debt (that is Bt = 0). Secondly, government decides to cut taxes by R1 - the
government therefore, runs a deficit of R1 in period t=1. Thirdly, government wants
to restore public debt to its original level of zero in period t=2. In order to do this,
govemment will have to raise taxes in that period sufficient to repay both the principal
as well as the interest that has accumulated on the R1 of debt issued in period t=1.
The interest will be R1.R(1+r).
The impact of this on the current value of real taxes can be shown as the following :
.!...[ -1 + (1 +r)]=o
P (1 +r)
(3)
The term of key importance in this equation (3) is the term in the second bracket,
which represents the change in the tax levy for period 1 (which is -R1) plus the
discounted change in taxes for period t=2 which are discounted by (1 + r). This implies
that the present value of taxes in period t=2 will be 1. It is also important to note that
the term on the left hand side is equal to zero. This is significant in that it suggests
that irrespective of what the price level is, the current value of real taxes will equate
to zero. Thus, accord~ng to equation (3), whether government runs a deficit or
increases current taxation Jevels to fund its given path of expenditure, therefore
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economic agents are responsible for an equivalent amount.. Barro therefore,
concludes that the Ricardian Equivalence proposition is valid. In other words, a bond-
financed budget deficit will not change private net wealth and, consequently,
economic agents will not change their initial decisions about desired permanent
consumption and investment.
This finding is profound, as it completely invalidates the Keynesian view. The validity
of this finding, crucially depends on a number of very restrictive assumptions (the
significance of which will be discussed in more detail in section 3.2). It is therefore,
of key importance to drop the assumptions made by Barro and see what effect this will
have on the model's initial results. Barro does this himself and finds that if the
assumption that govemment purchases are held constant is dropped, it will tend to
influence his initial finding, and wealth effects wilt operate in the model. However, if
any of the other assumptions are dropped or added to the model, Barro's initial
findings will hold. One does hO'llever, question whether perfect capital markets and
lump sum taxes (some of the assumptions made by Barro's model) are realistic in the
real world.
Furthermore, if Barro conclusion is correct, a bond-financed budget deficit, because
of its zero wealth effect, will have no impact on interest rates, consumption paths,
investment or on the level of output in the economy. Hence, according to Barro's
model, the increase in private saving 'Hill completely offset the decline in public saving
implied by the deficit and, interest rates will not be required to change (as the saving-
investment balance has not been disturbed). Consequently, there will be no crowding
out effects associated with the issuance of public debt as suggested by the Keynesian
model, under the Ricardian Equivalence approach.
An evaluation of the Ricardian Equivalence approach
A. Permanent Income/Life-cycle Hypothesis. Seater (1993) provides further
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validation of the logic behind the Ricardian Equivalence approach by pointing out that
it (and its results) are consistent with the Permanent Income/Life Cycle Hypothesis
(PILCH). Seater (1993) argues that the Ricardian Equivalence approach is merely a
generalisation (and in part extension) of the PILCH (a model which analyses
household decision making).
The PILCH is a combination of two hypothesis, Franco Modigliani's Life-Cycle
Hypothesis and Milton Friedman's Permanent Income Hypothesis. The PILCH is built
on the belief that economic agents want to preserve a smooth level of consumption
throughout their lifetimes, and because income tends to deviate from its long run
trend, economic agents must save in certain periods (for example, when transitory
income is above its trend), in order to ensure that their standard of living is not
affected in future periods where their income may be below its long run trend.
Therefore, according to the PILCH, economic agents alter their consumption patterns
such that the current value of their income stream is equal to the current value of their
consumption path.
An examination of the 'M>rkings of PILCH most certainly leads one to understand the
motivation behind Seater's (1993) conclusion that the Ricardian Equivalence
proposition is merely an extension of the PILCH. The PILCH supports the view that
households will smooth out deviations frorn their consumption path. Consequently,
should government run a bond-financed budget deficit, households will merely save
more in that period in order to compensate for the higher future tax liabilities implied
by the deficit, as the optimal savings-investment decision will not be disturbed. This
conclusion is essentially very similar to what is suggested by the Ricardian view.
B. Microeconomic Analysis. The Ricardian approach is also supported by the
microeconomic analysis of intertemporal utility maximisation. In a microeconomic
framework, the Ricardian Equivalence approach can be shown using the Fisher





FIGURE 2 A diagrammatic version of the Fisher model
The Ricardian view can be understood in terms of a Fisher diagram (see Figure 2),
as follows: the economic agent maximises utility at a point where her utility function
(U 1) is tangent to her budget constraint (which has a slope -(1+r». At this point the
equilibrium levels of consumption during period 1 and 2 are C*1 and C*2 respectively.
If income increases in period 1, due to government running a budget deficit in period
1, but declines in period 2 (due to governmE~nt increasing taxation so as to repay the
debt) by the same amount as the initial increase in income in period 1, then, the two
period budget constraint will remain unchanged. Hence, the optimal consumption
decision remains the same as before government debt was introduced. Using the
Fisher equation (which is the mathematical equivalent of the above diagram) one can
observe that the Ricardian Equivalence approach most certainly appears convincing






In equation (4) the equilibrium levels of consumption are C1" in period 1 and C; in
period 2 (these levels are subject to the value of income in period 1 (Y1) and the
income in period 2 (Y2) ~ich is discounted by the interest rate (1+r». Using equation
(4), assume government reduces taxes by T, and that this tax reduction is financed
by the sale of govemment bonds to the private sector. ThenJ traditional economists
will argue that the representative economic agent will perceive this tax reduction as
an addition to private net wealth. They will now have an income of Y1 + T in period 1.
However, if government purchases remain the same, then what is necessary, given
the government's budget constraint, is that taxes in period 2 will have to be increased
by (1+r)T. This implies that the current value of income of the economic agent remains
the same as prior to the issue of debt, and that the economic agent's budget
constraint will also be unchanged. Thus, the economic agent (who is assumed to be
a utility maximiser) will choose an equivalent level of consumption, as they did prior
to the tax reduction.
This can be illustrated as follows:
Y2 -(1 +r)T Y2 * C *,W=Yl+T+ -y +-=C 1+_
1+r 1 1+r 1+r
(5)
Hence, one can conclude that the Ricardian Equivalence approach is also strongly
supported by the Fisher model of intertemporal choice, as it reinforces the Ricardian
view that economic agents will not change their initial consumption decisions when
government runs a bond-financed budget deficit. Hence budget deficits will not be
associated with positive wealth effects as suggested by the Keynesian view.
2.4 Conclusion
A review of the contemporary theories about the potency of expansionary fiscal policy
(via a bond-financed budget defICit) shows that there is little consensus. Furthermore,
none of the theories are exempt from criticism, yet, it is the Keynesian view of the
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economy that has dominated the field.
Despite its appeal (the fact there is substantial theoretical support), the approach
based on Ricardian Equivalence approach is still not a generally accepted view. This
is, in part, due to it coming under heavy criticism from many economic theorists.
Consequently, before the theory based on Ricardian Equivalence approach can
become a mainstream theory in the field, the issues that the critics raise10 need to be
carefully addressed, on both theoretical and empirical grounds.
10 These issues will be covered in greater detail in chapter 3.2.
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CJ:tAPTER THREE
THE RICARDIAN EQUIVALENCE DEBATE
3.1 The Barro (1974) Model
Barro (1974) attempts to demonstrate that, provided rational economic agents obtain
utility from the utility of their descendants, then they will wish to leave them positive
bequests11. In such circumstances finite12 horizons will be no impediment to the
validity of the Ricardian Equivalence approach. Barro's model is an example of a
model which has done much to rekindle and develop an interest in the Ricardian
Equivalence. However, the Barro's model analysed in this section is only an
illustration of a model wtlich supports the Ricardian view, it must be emphasized that
it is not the Ricardian view.
Barro essentially argues that if finite-lived economic agents have already chosen to
leave positive bequests to their heirs in the absence of public debt, the introduction
of public debt will not create new opportunities to transfer resources away from
children to parents (as suggested by the traditional approach), as parents will be
aware of the higher future tax liability implied by the current debt for tax swop and will
merely add the additional 'Health made available by the current tax cut to the amount
they already intended to bequest, so as to ensure that the future prosperity of their
descendants is not impaired.
Consequently, Barro contends that the size of the national debt (or the deficit) will not
matter in equilibrium. This is because changes in the level of national debt will have
11
12
A bequest gives the current generation (parents) the ability to influence
the future prosperity of their descendants (children).
'Finite' lives (horizons) refers to the point that human life expectancy is
limited and consequently, economic agents base their economic
decisions according to a given (finite) planning period (horizon).
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no impact on real economic decisions (as the debt neutrality approach contends) as
at equilibrium private saving will increase such that the reductton in government
saving is completely offset. Barrols conclusion suggests that if one plots real private
savings and real government saving in such a situation, one will find that they are a
mirror image of each other, the idea being that when government dissaves by running
a deficit, private saving will increase by an equivalent amount.
It is important to point out that Barrols conclusion (that changes in national debt will
not matter at equilibrium) does not seem to take account of the fact that a debt for tax
swop in a country with an unequal distribution of income (wealth) may well have a
significant distributional effect. The idea being that, those economic agents who will
buy the bonds will tend to be those who belong to the top income bracket, but the
higher future taxation implied by the current debt for tax swop will more than likely be
levied on all income groups and therefore, an distributional effect will be associated
with the issue of debt in such circumstances. This kind of distributional effect is very
important 'Nhen one is analysing the impact of budget deficits in economies such as
South Africa, where any redistribution of wealth away from those who are already
extremely poor may have dire consequences on their welfare. McGrath (1979)
analyses what redistributional impact government's fiscal policies may have on the
distribution of wealth, and finds government fiscal policy does indeed play a
significant role in the allocation of resources in the South African economy.
In Barrols defence, however, he was prinlarily concerned with the impact of bond-
financed budget deficits in more developed economies, which will tend to have less
of these inequalities 13,
The effect of 'finite lives' on the operation of the Ricardian
Equivalence Approach
13 This issue (and its importance as a possible flaw in Ricardian theory) will
be considered in greater detail in section 3.2
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The assumption that government bonds are perceived as 'net wealth' by the private
sector is an integral component of many theoretical analyses of the real monetary and
fiscal effects of a change in the stock of public debt. Should government bonds not
be perceived as an addition to private net wealth (as the Ricardian view contends),
the theories that hinge on this assumption are drawn into question.
In review, the traditional view maintains that the private sector will perceive bonds as
an addition to net wealth if they do not expect to face the higher future tax liabilities
implied by the current debt for tax swop in their own lifetime14, and will increase
consumption demand (the exact extent will depend on the marginal propensity to
consume) in line with the perceived increase in their net wealth. This increase in
aggregate demand will move the economy to a new (higher output) level and real
interest rates will have to rise so as the restore the saving-investment balance, this
will tend to 'crowd-out' investment in the short run. The consequences in the long run
are that there witl be a smaller stock of productive capital available to future
generations.
Consequently, one of the main criticisms levied against the Ricardian view is the fact
that life is 'finite', and therefore, if finite·lived economic agents do not expect to face
the higher tax liabilities implied by the current debt for tax swop, positive wealth
effects will be associated with a bond-financed budget deficit. More formally, critics
of the Ricardian view argue that the relevant horizon for future taxes (which is often
assumed to correspond to the remaining average life of the current taxpayer), will be
shorter than that for the interest payments and if this is the case, then a stream of
equal values for interest payments and taxes will have a net positive present value
(Barro, 1974 p. 1097).
It is in response to this criticism that Barro formulates the following model in which he
attempts to show that finite horizons are no impediment to the validity of the Ricardian
14 They base their view on the finiteness of life, which will mean that
economic agents will make decisions in terms of a finite horizon.
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Equivalence approach. He contends that, even if horizons are finite, economic agents
will not perceive government bonds as an addition to net wealth.
The model
Barro (1974) develops a version of the Samuelson (1958) - Diamond's (1965)
overlapping-generations model15 with physical capital, to illustrate what effect a bond-
financed budget deficit will have on economic agent's economic decisions, if any. This
is a static16 intertemporal model with overlapping-generations VJhere individuals have
finite lives.
Barro (1974) generates a model which he believes isolates this issue. In order to do
these assumptions are made:
(i) economic agents live for two periods, which are distinguished by the
superscripts y (young) and 0 (old) in the model.
(ii) Generations are numbered successively beginning with the generation that is
currently old (subscript 1); followed by the current old generation's descendants,
YA10 are currently young (subscript 2); followed by their descendants (subscript
3); and so on.
(iii) There are the same number of people, N, in each generation (thus suggesting
zero population growth). Furthermore, all economic agents in the given economy
are identical in terms of tastes, therefore, their utility functions are assumed to
15
16
This model assumes that each generation's lives for a fixed amount of
time (life is finite) it also assumes that each generation's lifetime overlaps
with the other.
The model is static in the sense that economic growth is eliminated in the
model.
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be identical, labour productivity is assumed to be identical, and it is also
assumed there is no technological change over time.
(iv) The members of each generation work a fixed amount of time (one unit). They
only work \Nhile young, and receive a wage income of (w) for their labour.
Expectations of the wage income for future generations is assumed to be fixed
at the current level (w). This is a critical assumption as growth in real wages
VYOuld make positive bequests unlikely (and the existence of positive bequests
is a key component of this model).
(v) Asset holdings (A) take the form of equity capital (K) and consequently (in this
model) govemment bonds will be an additional form in V'klich assets can be held.
The rate of retum on assets is (r) and is assumed to be paid out once per period.
Expectations on r (the rate of return on assets) for future periods are assumed
to be fixed at the current level.
(vi) Bequests in this model are assumed to be made to the immediate descendants.
For example, if a member of the (1) generation holds an amount of assets, AOiJ
while old, generation (2) will receive the bequest. Furthermore, the asset
holdings while old (in the second period) constitute the amount available for
bequest.
(vii) In order to isolate the effect of shifts in tax liabilities and government debt for a
given path of government expenditure, it is assumed that government neither
demands commodities nor provides public services, as government actions tend
to influence circumstances in the economy. Although this assumption is
unrealistic, if it was not made it'M)uld be more difficult to isolate only the impact
that the provision of govemment debt 'M)uld have on the consumption decisions
of economic agents.
(viii) It is assumed that the initial level of taxation and government debt is zero.
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(ix) Consumption (denoted by c in the model) and receipt of interest income both
o~r at the start of the period.
Given these assumptions the budget constraint equation17 for the representative
individual of generation 1, who is currently old, will take the following form:
(6)
As shown in equation (6) the representative economic agent is subject to an
intertemporal budget constraint, which requires that total expenditure (payments)
cannot exceed total income (funds). Total resources available for expenditure are
assets held 'Nhile young, AY1, plus the bequest (inheritance) received from the
previous generation, AOa .Total expenditure (which is the right hand side of this
equation (6» will take the form of consumption while old, c01, plus the bequest
provision, A01, which will be bequeathed to a member of generation 2, less interest
earnings at rate r on this asset holding. he interest earnings (r) on the bequest
provision, A01, is in fact a source of funds as it is subtracted from expenditure.
The budget constraint for the representative economic agent of generation 2 (who is
currently young), given that wage payments (w) are assumed to occur at the start of
the young period, is the following:
(7)
Equation (7) sho'NS that total resources are provided by wage payments (w), and total
expenditure takes the form of consumption white young, cY2, plus the bequest
provision (vJlich is assumed to be bequeathed to generation 3 by the model), AY2, less
17 An economic agent cannot violate his or her budget constraint, which
requires that total expenditure (payments) is equated to total revenue
(sources).
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(remembering interest earning are in fact a source of funds) interest earnings at a rate
(r) on this asset holding.
The budget constraint equation (8) for the representative economic agent of
generation 2 when old, will take the following form:
(8)
The key component in equation (7) and (8) to Barro's analysis, is A02 as it suggests
that a proportion of lifetime resources of generation 2 will be left in the form of a
bequest.
Barro believes that bequests are motivated by a concern (an altruistic concern) for the
members of the next generation (2). Barro notes that this concern can be modelled
by the t'M> types of models of 'interdependent' preferences - that is, this concern can
be modelled by incorporating either anticipated consumption levels or attainable utility
of the next generation into the utility function of the present generation. Barro argues
that so long as a member of generation (1) can transfer resources to a member of
generation (2) only through the transfer of unrestricted purchasing power, the two
models will be equivalent, in that they will both be indirectly implying a concern for the
endowment of a member of generation (2). Despite their appeal, this kind of modelling
is not favoured by most economists (as it requires the integration of two different
individuals utility preferences into a single utility function), so Barro's model which
incorporates this kind of modelling must be regarded with caution.
Barro concludes that for the purposes of his analysis the critical condition is that when
the utility of the currently old generation depends on the endowment of a member of
generation (2), then there is a 'net'18 bequest rather than a 'gross' bequest.
18 A 'net' bequest suggests that there win be certain deductions (for
example, interest payments) subtracted from the initial 'gross' bequest.
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Barro then assumes that the utility of a member of generation (1) depends solely on
an economic agent's 0Y.11 consumption in both periods, CYj and COj (consumption while
young and consumption 'Nhile old) plus the attainable utility of her immediate
descendant U*i+119.The utility function for the representative economic agent of the (1)
generation will therefore, take the following form:
(9)
Equation (9) suggests that the current generation (1) will maximise utility (Ui) by
choosing the optimal amounts of c Y1 (consumption while young, c01 (consumption
while old, and the maximum attainably utility of generation (2+1), U*i+1)
Barro then considers the impact of including the attainable utility of the previous
generation (U*i+1)' into the utility function of a member of the (1) generation (UJ
In order to do this Barro points out that the following conditions are critical and must
be satisfied:
1.) each member of generation 1 allocates her resources to maximise U1, such
that equations (6) (the budget constraint while generation 1 is old), (7) (the
budget constraint while generation 1 is young), and (9) (the utility function of
generation 1 which includes the maximum utility function of the next
generation) are satisfied,
2.) the inequality condition (c Yj , C°j, A~ ) ~ 0 holds for all (i) (this means that
consumption and the bequest provision are positive).
The bequest choice, bearing in mind conditions (1) and (2) must be satisfied, takes
19 This is a maximum value function,( utility = U (X1, ~, ....... , ~), where
there are n goods to choose from, the economic agents objective is to
maximise utility from n goods), constrained by the budget constraint
(endowments) and prices.
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into account the effect of A01 (generation 1's bequest provision) on generation 2's
resources, the impact of U*2 on U1, and on the chain of dependence of U2on l1'3' of
U3 on U~, and so on. These considerations result in the following solution for
generation 1:
(10a)
Equation (10a) indicates that consumption (which is a payment) while generation 1
is old, C °1' will be determined by the sources of revenue (as an economic agent
cannot violate her budget constraint). In this model the sources of revenue are assets
held 'Nhile young, A01• plus the inheritance received from the previous generation, AOo,
and the wage payment (w) which will determine AY1 (the assets held while young), and
the interest (determined by the interest rate (r» earnings on the bequest provision.
A 0 1=_11 (A Yl+A °O_c °l)=A ol(A Yl=A °O,w,r)
-r
(10b)
Equation (10b) indicates that the bequest provision, A01, which will be given to
generation 2, will be determined by generation 1's consumption while old, CO1, which
is determined by the sources of revenue for generation 1 (A Y1, A °o, wand r).
For generation 2 (and more generally for members of any generation (i) ~ 2), the
solution will take the following form:
(11 )
Equation (11) shO'NS that consumption (expenditure) 'Nhile young will be a function of
the sources revenue in the young period, those being the inheritance received from
generation 1, A01r the wage payment (w) which is received in the young period, and
the interest earning (r) on the assets put aside for bequest.
30
(12)
Equation (12) highlights the point that the amount which generation (2) can leave to
be bequeathed (which is in a sense an expenditure) in the young period will be
determined by consumption in period 1 (wtlich is also expenditure), which is a function
of assets received from the pervious generation, the wage payment (w) and the
interest earned (r). Hence, one can see that the two forms of expenditure will be
constrained by the sources of revenue. Consumption (C02) in generation 2's old period
will be determined in a similar manner, except in the old period assets held while
young will be an additional source of revenue. The bequest provision (A02) in
generation 2's old period will also be detetimined in a similar manner to that in the
young period, in this case, hO\N8ver, the assets held while young are an additional
source of revenue.
Barro then closes20 the model by specifying a constant-returns-to·scale production
function that depends on the amounts of capital and labour input, and by equating the
marginal products of capital and labour to (r) and (w), respectively. The value of (r) for
the current period is such that the supply of assets is equated to demand, that is, the
aggregate asset demand equation will take the following form:
(13)
Where K(r,w) is such that the marginal product of capital is equated to (r) and the
marginal product of labour is equated to (w). The current demand for assets depends
on, A01 + AY2 (if one remembers equations (10) to (14), depends on (r), (w», and the
previous period's value of K ('Nhich is equal to AY1 + AOo)21. With the marginal product
20
21
If a model is closed, it suggests that the model incorporates all the
components which could impact on one another.
N is not included explicitly into the aggregate asset demand equation (15)
as it is assumed constant by Barro (1974).
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of labour equated to (w) and with constant-returns-to-scale t and by assuming profit
maximisation and perfect competition, the factors are paid their marginal products,
output is therefore given by the following equation:
y=rK+w (14)
Equation (14) illustrates that factor payments (wage payments made to generation 1
and 2 and interest payments (r) on asset holdings) exhaust total output (y).
Equations (7), (8), (13), (14) imply a commodity market clearing condition:
(15)
Where AK is the change in capital stock from the pervious to current period, the value
of .6.K will be zero in a steady state, (Barro (1974) does not, however, restrict the
model to steady-state situations and consequently, the inclusion of this variable is
important).
Barro's model is now complete. One now has to look at what the introduction of
public debt (via the sale of government bonds) will have on the decisions made by
individuals who operate in the model.
Barro assumes that govemment issues a given amount of debt via the sale of bonds,
B (which is assumed to be in the form of one-period, real-value bonds). Barro
assumes that these bonds pay the specified amount of real interest, ra, in the current
period and the specified real principal, B, in the next period. It is further presumed
that asset holders regard equity and government bonds as perfect substitutes in the
economic agent's utility function. This is significant in that it suggests that the returns
to govemment debt and to real assets are highly correlated. However, the accuracy
of this assumption has to be questioned as equity and govemment bonds tend to
have different risks and 'liquidity' (Buchanan, 1976).
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Barro believes that the government bond issue can either be assumed to take the
form of a helicopter drop to currently old households (generation 1), or they can be
sold on a competitive capital market. Therefore, no one group is assumed to dominate
the market place, with the proceeds from the sale used to initiate a lump-sum transfer
payment to generation 122.
The govemment consequently runs a bond-financed budget deficit in period 1, hence,
if the govemment wishes to restore public debt to its original level, it will have to raise
revenue (either by increasing future taxation, money creation, or in the reissue of
bonds) in order to repay the accumulated interest (r) and the principal (B). Barro
(p. 1102) assumes that increased future taxation will provide the funds for the
repayment of the principal and the accumulated interest earnings.
Now, having reproduced Barro's (1974) model, one has to look at what impact the
inclusion of debt, B, will have on each component of Barro's initial model. Barro
started his model by setting up generation 1's budget constraint while old (without
government). If government bonds are now introduced into the budget constraint of
generation 1 (while old) it will take the following form:
(16)
22 These two operations, at first glance, do not appear equivalent at all.
Buchanan (1976 p. 338), hoVJever, believes if the bonds dropped from the
helicopter are marketable, those who receive them may, as desired,
convert them to currency. The net effects are the same, as the sale of
government bonds to voluntary purchasers along with the lump-sum
transfer of the proceeds, will be to the same individuals who would have
received the bonds in the first model (Buchanan, 1976). This argument
\NOuld however, fail in the South African economy, and these two types
of operation would by no means be eqUivalent. The extreme disparities
in income in South Africa \NOuld mean that a helicopter drop would be a
more equitable means of distributing the bonds as, if they were sold on
a competitive capital market only those individuals who occupy the top
income bracket in South Africa could afford those bonds and many of
those who may have received the bonds via a helicopter drop will be
excluded.
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In equation (16), B represents the lump-sum transfer payment, which is assumed to
occur at the beginning of the period, so that the government bonds are an additional
source of revenue to generation 1. It is also critical to notice that from this equation
(16) c 0 1 (consumption in generation 1's old period) varies inversely with (1-r)A
0
1 - B
(the 'net' bequest23) for any given value of A Y1 and AOo. This point is important as it
indicates that if generation 1 decides to increase expenditure (C0 1) then there will have
to be a compensating decline in the amount to be bequeathed to the next generation
2 (that is A0 1 must decline). This is significant as it suggests that if generation 1
increases consumption (which generation 1 may well opt to do as they now have an
additional source of revenue, B), it will be at the expense of future generations, as the
initial value of A0 1 will decrease. Therefore, from equation (16) one has an idea of
\Nhat the optimal decision for generation 1 will be, that being that the economic agent
must not increase consumption in line with the increase in 'net wealth' provided by the
issue of government bonds. Consequently, equation (16), hints at the solution of
Barro's model, but it does not clearly indicate how and why it arises, so one has to
look at Barro's entire model for the complete solution.
Generation 2's current budget constraint, while young, after the introduction of debt
in period 1, will take the following form:
(17)
Where, rB represents the tax levy (lump-sum) for the repayment of government
accumulated interest payments on the debt, which Barro assumes will be paid by
generation 2 in the young period. Therefore, rB, represents an additional payment
(expense) that has to be paid by generation 2, which it was not obligated to pay prior
to the introduction of debt in the economy in period 1.
The next period's budget constraint, while old, for generation 2 will take the following
form:
23 It is a 'net' bequest as interest earnings have been deducted.
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(18)
Where B, represents the tax levy for repayment of the principal, which Barro (1974)
assumes generation 2 will be obligated to pay in the old period. Therefore B, in
generation 2's budget constraint (while old) represents an additional payment (or
expense), which it was not obligated to pay until the introduction of debt in period 1.
The two budget constraints (equations (17) and (18» can be combined to form the
following two period budget constraint:
(19)
The above equation (19) suggests that the maximum attainable utility function (in
indirect form24) will be as follows:
(20)
The key component of this equation is that the 'net bequest' «1 - r)A0 1 - B), determines
the resources available for the members of generation 2. Using the information from
equation (16), (9) and (20), the predetermined value of c Y11 U1 (the utility function for
generation 1) can be written as follows:
(21 )
If one assumes that c Y1, A Y1 + A00 I W, r, cannot be changed, it is clear the choice
problem (of how to maximise utility) for members of generation 1 amounts to the
24 Because of an economic agents desire to maximise utilityI given a budget
constraint, the optimal level of utility attainable will depend indirectly on
the prices of goods being brought and on the economic agents income.
This dependence is reflected by the indirect utility function
(Nicholson, 1995).
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optimal selection of the 'net bequest', (1 - r)A01 - B, subject to Barro's constraint that
the 'gross' bequest must be positive, A01 ~ O. If this requirement holds (bequests are
positive), and is not restrictive25, any marginal change in B will be met solely by a
change in A01that maintains the real value of net bequest, (1 - r)A01.. B. This response
in A01 will keep the values of c °1' C Y2' c
O
2and A °2 unchanged from their original level.
Consequently, Barro concludes that the levels of attainable utility of generations 1,
2,3 will be unaffected by a change in B.
This solution, that the amount to be bequeathed (A01) will increase by an amount
equivalent to the initial issue of debt, fits in with the initial prediction made by
equations (16) which suggested that economic agents in generation 1 would not want
to increase consumption in line with the increase in 'net' wealth made available by the
introduction of public debt, as it \Mluld have an inverse impact on the amount available
for bequest to future generations (and hence, their attainable utility). In terms of
equation (16), the increase in A01(the gross bequest) will be such that the budget
constraint is equated. Remembering that the issue of public debt was an increase in
revenue (funds), the increase in the bequest (a payment) A01, will be of an equivalent
value to the bonds.
It is also important to look at the effect that a change in B will have on (r). This effect
can be isolated by modifying equation (14), the current market asset clearing
condition:
(22)
From this equation (22) it can be seen that an increase in B infers a one-ta-one
increase in the asset supply on the left hand side of the equation (22). On the right
hand side (net asset demand), A01, rises by 1/(1 - r) times the change in S, such that
the size of the net bequest, (1 ... r)A01 - B remains constant. Furthermore, with cY2fixed,
the increase in rB (taxes) in equation (22) implies that AY2falls by r/(1 - r) times the
25 The validity of this assumption is addressed later in this section 3.2
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change in B. Therefore, the net change in total asset demand is a one-to.-one increase
with B, which infers that r will not have to change to ensure asset market clearing.
Similarly, the commodity market clearing condition will also continue to hold at the
initial value of r because the bond issue has no aggregate impact on consumption
demand.
Consequently, Barro finds using his specified model, that if prior to the issue of
govemment bonds, A0 1 ~ 0 (as the old generation 1 has selected a positive bequest
or 'gift'26), suggests that they feel responsible for the future vvell-being of their
descendants27. The change in B (a bond-financed budget deficit) does not alter the
relevant opportunity set. Through the appropriate adjustment of the bequest, the
values of current, future consumption and attainable utility, will be unaffected by the
change in public debt. This implies that there will be no net wealth effects associated
with it. Hence, no aggregate effect on demand or on interest rates. Consequently,
Barro (1974), in his view, reestablishes the validity of the Ricardian Equivalence
approach. In his model, he shows that increased government expenditure is financed
via increased taxation, or is bond-financed. This is inconsequential, as the impact of
these alternative financing instruments on the economy will be 'equivalent', in that
there are no wealth effects associated with either financing methods.
Barro (p. 1103) does, however, note that if prior to the issue of government bonds,
there is a corner solution28, A0 1 < 0 - then an increase in B creates a relevant new




A intergenerational gift is for example, parents investing in their children's
education.
Barro (1974) assumes that if parents care about the attainable utility of
their children, they will automatically leave them a positive bequest. The
validity of this assumption in a country characterised by extreme poverty
must be questioned because, although parents may well be concerned
about the future well-being of their children, they may, however, not be
financially able to leave their children any positive bequests.
This means that the current living must make a decision as to the
wellbeing of the future generation.
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detail in section 3.2. In such a situation households will increase consumption (as
government bonds will be perceived as an addition to net wealth), the value of (r)
would tend to increase as there will be an excess of earning-asset supply over
demand and this increase in (r) would induce a drop in capital formation, which
constitutes the real effect of government debt issue as described by the Keynesian
approach.
3.2 An Evaluation of the Assumptions Required for the Operation of
the Ricardian Equivalence Approach
The Ricardian Equivalence approach and its profound implication of the irrelevance
of fiscal policy, however, depends upon a variety of strong assumptions29 about the














The individual's planning horizon is infinite (on page 38 in this dissertation);
Bequests are motivated by altruism (on page 40);
Intergenerational transfers are equivalent to intergenerational bequests (on
page 43);
Altruism (of the form assumed by Barro (1974» is insufficient to ensure the
operation of the Ricardian Equivalence approach(on page 44);
The bequest motive is operative (on page 44);
Altruism is 'one-sided (on page 46);
Capital markets are either perfect, or fail only in specific ways (on page 46);
Taxes are non-distortionary (on page 51);
The postponement of taxes does not redistribute resources across families with
systematically different marginal propensities to consume (on page 52);
Certainty of future income levels and taxation (on page 53);
InteresUgrowth rate differential is constant (on page 56);
The economy operates at a full-employment level (on page 56);
Apart from the criticisms already mentioned in the survey of Barro's
(1974) model.
38
13.) Consumers are rational and farsighted (on page 57).
One can certainly make a strong case against the Ricardian Equivalence approach
result (in its pure form) by weighing the validity of each of these assumptions.
HO\N8ver, it needs to be noted that there are some valid counter-arguments to some
of these criticisms (which have been included in this section) which tend to reaffirm
the validity of the Ricardian Equivalence approach and its conclusions on the potency
of fiscal policy. Therefore, before one can accept or reject the Ricardian Equivalence
approach one has to analyse these criticisms in detail, and section 3.2 provides an
overview of the relevant issues.
1. The individual's planning horizon is infinite
Although, the criticism that the Ricardian Equivalence approach is dependant on the
existence of an infinite planning horizon is specifically addressed by Barro's (1974)
model, it is so pivotal that it requires further explanation and investigation.
The suggestion made by the 'finite-lives' argument, is essentially that individuals are
motivated by limited life expectancy of human-beings which means that, individuals
will only capitalize on the taxes that they expect to face before dying. Consequently,
if one considers a deficit-financed tax cut, and one assumes that the required higher
future taxes are expected to occur after a certain economic agent's lifetime has
ceased, then it is apparent that it 'NOuld not to be in the economic agents own interest
to save the extra wealth made available by the current reduction in taxes, but rather
to react by increasing current consumption demand. Hence, it would appear that finite
horizons eliminate the possibility of the existence of the Ricardian Equivalence, for
there will always be a fraction of the population whose current tax reduction will not
be matched by a future tax repayment, and they will therefore, take no action to
ensure that there are funds available to repay the increased future tax liability implied
by the current tax cut (Blanchard, 1985).
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Barro (1974) maintains that this line of reasoning only vvorks if the typical economic
agent has a complacent attitude towards the government shifting a tax burden onto
her descendants. In other words, Barro contends that the finite horizons argument
neglects the possibility of an 'altruistic'30 concem amongst individuals. If, Barro's belief
is correct, and economic agents feel altruistically towards their family members, it will
be optimal for them to react to the higher future tax liabilities, which are implied by the
bond-financed budget deficit, with a compensating increase in voluntary transfers. For
example, parents will adjust their bequests to their children 'vVhile they are still living
so as to compensate them for the higher tax obligations implied by a current deficit-
financed tax cut. Otherwise, children could provide for their parents in their old age
by adjusting the amount given to them according to the current value of the expected
stream of future taxes.
Barro argues that the extra wealth made available by the current reduction in taxes
will be saved (in the form of a higher gross bequest), and not added to net wealth, so
that the optimal balance of wealth between the generations is restored. Barro claims
that this altruistic motive will extend ad infinitum, as each successive generation will
obtain utility from the well-being of its children.
In conclusion, Barro finds that the Ricardian results, 'vVhich at first glance appear to
hinge on the assumption of infinite lives (and hence, horizons), can remain valid in a
model with 'finite' lifetimes even if only a small31 'altruistic' bequest motive exists.
One clear objection to Barro's line of reasoning is that not all wealth holders wiH have
children and will, therefore not necessarily be connected to future generations as
30
31
The treatment of another's utility (well-being) as a component of one's
own utility has become known as 'altruism', Neoclassical economists,
hO\Never, vvould argue that economic agents are primarily concerned with
their own utility and not the utility of others.
Wail (1987) tests Barro's (1974) contention that aven a small bequest
motive 'MII be sufficient to ensure the Ricardian result. Weil (1987 p. 382)
finds that the bequest motive would have to be in feasibly large for the
Ricardian results to occur.
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required for the operation of the Ricardian Equivalence approach in the Barro model.
Such childless individuals will regard a bond-financed budget deficit as an increase
in net 'Health and will thus increase their planned consumption demand in line with the
increase in their net wealth, because they will tend to have a relatively higher marginal
propensity to consume than individuals who do have children, (Tobin, 1980). Thus,
the debt for tax svvop in such circumstances will be associated with an expansion of
aggregate demand, which is in line with the traditional view.
Barro (1989) acknowledges that the existence of such childless individuals will tend
to discredit his view, he also notes that such individuals will only constitute a small
percentage of the population. Therefore the impact they will have is, on aggregate,
negligible, and in many instances the effect of childless individuals will be nullified by
the existence of families with an above average number of descendants.
2. Bequests are motivated by altruism
Some authors have conceded the importance of Barro's (1974) concept of
intergenerational transfers in the refutation of the traditional view of the economic
consequences of budget deficits. They do, however, raise the issue that motivation
behind the transfers (which may not be altruism as contended by Barro) is more
consequential for the Ricardian results than initially suggested by Barro. Three
alternative vie\NS of vvhat may constitute the motivation behind bequest provision have
emerged from this concern.
A. Bequests are a strategic device whereby parents attempt to control the
behaviour of their children. Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers (1985) consider an
alternative to the altruistic bequest motive of Barro. They argue that bequests are not
driven by altruism but are rather a strategic device whereby parents can attempt to
manipulate the behaviour of their children (for example, parents may use bequests as
a kind of insurance to ensure that their children do not do something which may result
in a reduction in their YJelfare, or to ensure that they are not neglected by their
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children). They argue that such influence may be overt, that is, parents may
manipulate the behaviour of their heirs by threatening to disinherit inattentive children,
or it may be more subtle in nature, for example, they may reward attentive children
with family heirlooms. Should this kind of motive exist Bernheim, Shleifer and
Summers conclude, that it 'hOuld tend to negate the predictions"of the Ricardian view,
as economic agents (parents) will be made better off by a deficit-financed tax cut, and
in this instance, they will not necessarily raise transfers to fully offset the governments
actions32.
Barro (1989) believes that Bemheim, Shleifer and Summer's (1985) conceptualisation
of the motivation behind bequests has one s ortcoming. He believes it implies that the
interaction between parents and children can be viewed as comparable to the
purchases of services on markets, as it suggests that parents tend to pay their
children 'wages', rather than conferring bequests, and one has to question whether
this is a true reflection of what occurs in reality.
B. Bequests are part of an implicit or explicit contract between parents and
children. Kotlikoff and Sprivak (1981) provide yet another alternative view of the
possible motive behind bequests. They argue that there may be an implicit or explicit
contract between children and their elderly parents, in which parents agree to
bequeath the children their YJealth 'Nhen they die, in exchange for the knowfedge that
their children will support them in the event that their assets are exhausted, due
perhaps to unexpected longevity. In this sense, bequests are used as an insurance
against the risk of low consumption in their old age, due to an extended period of
consumption (Seater, 1993). Should this be the case, and Kotlikoff and Sprivak (1981 )
are correct, the Ricardian Equivalence approach would seem to fail, as the Ricardian
Equivalence approach requires that there are positive/altruistically motivated
bequests. Kotlikoff and Sprivak's (1981) findings suggest that bequests may not be
32 Barro (1974) himself notes that the Ricardian Equivalence approach is
unlikely to hold in a situation were exchange played a strong role in the
motivation of bequests.
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made on purely altruistic grounds but rather on more selfish grounds (the protection
of the bequeather's utility) and, furthermore, that there may well be a high incidence
of zero bequests (Feldstein, 1988).
In defence of the Ricardian view, several authors have found that roughly only 20%
of the population arrives at retirement with essentially no bequeathable assets
(Bemheim (1989). Consequently, what impact Kotlikoff and Sprivak's (1981)
alternative bequest motive theory will have on the existence of the Ricardian
Equivalence approach is unclear, as the incidence of zero bequests appears low.
Kotlikoff and Sprivak's (1981) results, nonetheless, highlight the possibility that
bequests are not entirely motivated by altruism as required by the Ricardian view.
C. Bequests are purely accidental. Another possibility is that bequests are entirely
accidental, and therefore, no discemable bequest motive exists. In this scenario
bequests arise only because individuals have uncertain lifetimes and often die sooner
than anticipated and in this situation their assets are passed on to children with no
altruism intended (Abel, 1985). So in this instance, no cognizance would have been
taken with regards to the recipients' (of the bequests) future tax labilities, as their
future wellbeing would not have been considered by that person at the time of death.
Although no model has been generated to test this specific issue one would not
expect the Ricardian Equivalence approach to hold ~ere bequests are purely
accidental.
In conclusion, it appears that non-altruistic bequest motives do not create the one-for-
one compensations of changes in current taxes to future taxes necessary for the
Ricardian Equivalence approach to hold true. Consequently, if bequests are not
motivated by altruism but rather but another motive the validity of the Ricardian view
'Nhich appears dependant on the existence of 'altruistically' motivated bequests is
drawn into question.
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3. Intergenerational 'transfers' are equivalent to intergenerational
'bequests'
Even if one assumes that Barro (1974) is correct and intergenerational transfers are
motivated by altruism, the Ricardian Equivalence approach does not remain
unquestioned. This is so because, the Ricardian Equivalence approach (according
to Barro's model) operates whether there is an operative intergenerational transfer
or bequest.
An intergenerational 'transfer' suggests that parents may make voluntary contributions
to their children's future welfare via increased expenditure on education or other
investment in human C4pital. HOYJever, this form of intergenerational transfer takes the
form of an expenditure rather than adding to the future generation's stock of wealth
(Feldstein, 1982). Consequently, one has to question whether the Ricardian
Equivalence approach holds in such circumstances (even though Barro contends that
it will), as parents may not increase these transfers in line with the increase in wealth
provided by the debt for tax swop as required for the operation of the Ricardian
Equivalence approach. Feldstein (1982 p. 5), however, notes that!f economic agents
respond to an increase in government debt, as required by the Ricardian Equivalence
approach by increasing such intergenerational transfers, this merely changes the
nature of the induced consumption and does not constitute a transfer of real capital.
Drazen (1978) however, disagrees with Feldstein (1982) in that he believes that
transfers of human capital (such as investments in education) are not equivalent to
conventional bequests for the bonds-as-net-wealth controversy. Drazen (1978)
contends that even if the absolute level of intergenerational transfers are positive, the
fact that many transfers are in the form of investments in education leaves a role for
govemment debt in expanding the choice set and increasing welfare, and in this way,
invalidating the Ricardian view.
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4. Altruism
Bemheim and Bagwell (1988) raise the issue that the altruism, of the form assumed
by Barro (1974), which is consequential enough to imply the Ricardian Equivalence,
Barro's view of altruism according to Bernheim and Bagwell is also important enough
to imply some rather implausible results.
Bernheim and Bagwell demonstrate that Barro's central result which essentially
establishes the insensitivity of consumption to the distribution of endowments over
family members .. depends only upon the existence of altruistically motivated transfers
between family members, and not upon the particular structure of the family tree.
This assumption of altruism (as seen by Barro), according to Bernheim and Bagwell,
if one takes into account the expansion of linkages between families, (that is, in one
way or another every individual in an economy is either related by blood or marriage),
gives rise to stronger neutrality properties under weaker conditions than those
suggested by Barro. Under such conditions, all government transfers will be irrelevant,
since they redistribute resources amongst individuals that are related - even though
they may only be related distantly. Because we do not observe such neutrality in
reality, Bemheim and Bagwell conclude that altruism, as seen by Barro, cannot be a
significant factor in the formulation of the bequeather's decision process.
5. The bequest motive is 'operative'
If one puts aside Bernheim and Bagwell's (1988) reservations, and assumes that
parents do regard their children altruistically, there are further difficulties associated
with the Ricardian Equivalence approach. Altruism guarantees the Ricardian
Equivalence approach only if the bequest motive is operative at all dates in the
absence. of debt. In other words, parents must not only take into account their
children's utility \AJhen calculating their own maximisation problem, but must also face
a situation 'Nere they must confer wealth onto their children prior to the issue of debt
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(Seater, 1993). This is because if parents cannot confer wealth onto their children
prior to the issue of debt, the issue of debt in these circumstances would not change
the initial position of parents.
Weil (1987) designs a model in "'Ihich he attempts to test what conditions would be
necessary for the bequest motive to be operative. According to Weil (p. 381), in order
for the Ricardian Equivalence approach to hold in an economy with a bequest motive,
there has to be dynamic efficiency33 in the economy without the bequest motive.
Weil's findings make sense intuitively because, if the economy was operating under
dynamic inefficiency, then it \M>uld be characterised by overcapitalisation and parents
would want to shift these liabilities onto their children (assuming that they are not
altruistic). Therefore, parents would want to consume the output that should go to
capital accumulation. In such circumstances a debt for tax swop will help parents to
do this, and debt will not be neutral in such circumstances, and the Ricardian
Equivalence approach will fail.
Weil continues to say that although dynamic efficiency is a necessary condition, it is
not a sufficient condition. Weil (p. 382) shows that parents would have to 'love their
children' very much for the transfer motive to operate, and according to his model this
situation is unlikely to occur. Weil concludes therefore, that the Ricardian Equivalence
approach, which requires that the bequest motive is operative, will tend to fail in
reality.
Altig and Davis (1989), however, using a closely related model to that of Weil, find
drastically different results: they find that for reasonable lifetime productivity profiles
and a moderate desire to smooth consumption intertemporality, parents must 'love
their children' only a little for the transfer motive to operate, which tends to reaffirm the
Ricardian view.
33 Dynamic efficiency suggests a kind of pareto optimality as in a
dynamically efficient economy it is not possible to improve one
generation's welfare without impairing the welfare of another (Seater,
1993).
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6. Altruism is 'one·sided'
Critics of the Ricardian view content that, if one accepts that parents behave
altruistically towards their children, it is also not unreasonable to suppose that
children feel altruistic towards their parents. Early investigations into this found that
if either bequest motive was operative, then the Ricardian proposition is likely to hold.
This then lead to an investigation into what would happen if both forms of altruism are
operative simultaneously. Kimball (1987) investigates the consequences of two-side
altruism on the validity of the Ricardian Equivalence approach.
Kimball (1987) addresses the problem of, if parents care for their children, and
children care for their parents, a situation Kimball refers to as the 'hall of mirrors',
then will there be a solution? Kimball analyses this 'hall of mirrors' or cycling problem
by imposing certain restrictions on the behaviour of individuals in the model and
analysing what consequences this will have on the validity of the Ricardian
Equivalence approach. Kimball places a number restrictions on the behaviour of
economic agents in his model. He concludes that if the economy tends towards the
Golden Rule solution34 then the Ricardian Equivalence approach and its implications
will not hold true in that economy.
A counter-argument to this line of reasoning however, is that in reality it appears that
the altruism parents feel towards their childref') is far greater than the altruism felt by
children towards their parents. Consequently, although tv/o-sided altruism may be
operative, the altruism felt by parents towards their children seems to predominate,
and although Kimball's line of reasoning has merit, its potential impact on the validity
of Ricardian Equivalence approach is likely to be negligible (Seater, 1993).
34 The Golden Rule solution ensures that capital is at the level that provides
maximum steady state consumption (Seater, 1993).
47
7. Imperfect loan markets
Another group of criticisms levied against the predictions of the Ricardian Equivalence
approach, are based on its apparent dependence on the assumption that capital
markets are perfect. Critics argue that in reality private credit markets tend to be
imperfect, and these imperfections are important as they not only influence the way
in vvhich economic agents behave, but also tend to constrain economic agents. There
are many sources of capital market imperfection and these include the lack of
information symmetry, differential borrowing rates, differing transaction costs,
government debt and liquidity. Critics of the Ricardian view, which highlight the
importance of capital market imperfections, tend to focus specifically on one particular
type of capital market imperfection which they believe will tend to invalidate the
Ricardian Equivalence approach and its predictions.
A. The lack of information symmetry. The one kind of capital market imperfection,
focused on by critics of the Ricardian view, is the lack of information symmetry
between borrowers and lenders. This lack of symmetry leads to the phenomenon of
'adverse selection' - adverse selection is seen to be a result of a situation 'Nhere
different economic agents have varying probabilities of experiencing favourable or
unfavourable outcomes. This issue, and its importance, can be seen as follows -
borrowers will have access to more pertinent information which will permit them to
better calculate their own probabilities of unfavourable outcomes as opposed to that
of potential lenders (Nicholson, 1995). This will have the important consequence of
'credit rationing' - that is, lenders may attempt to reduce their risk of unfavourable
outcomes by reducing the amount of credit available to potential borrowers.
The implications of credit rationing can be explained as follows. Say for example, an
economic agent expects income to substantially increase in the near future ( perhaps
due to an expected promotion vvhich will imply a substantial increase in salary), so this
economic agent may therefore, wish to increase current consumption through
borrowing in the current period. If she is unable to do so, perhaps due, in this
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instance, to severe credit rationing, the economic agent may well then choose to use
the extra income made available from a current deficit-financed tax cut to increase
current consumption. Thus, the distortion in the economy caused by credit rationing
will tend to invalidate the debt neutrality suggested by the Ricardian Equivalence
approach. Alternatively, consider an economic agent that wishes to borrow "x"
amount, and is only able to borrow a portion of those funds, but not the entire amount.
This situation may occur when the lenders of those funds take into account the effect
that a tax cut will have on that economic agent's ability to repay the loan. The lenders
may therefore, reduce the amount of money the borrower wants to borrow by the
amount of the current tax cut (the idea is that the borro'Ner will have to return the
funds borrowed this period in a future period, when higher taxes are levied in order
to repay the debt issued in a previous period. Therefore their ability to repay the funds
borrowed is effected. This is taken into account by the lender). This will tend to
invalidate the Ricardian Equivalence approach.
Hubbard and Judd (1986) analyse the issue of capital market imperfections by looking
at vvhat impact credit rationing has on the ability of economic agents to borrow against
future income and thus, the operation of the Ricardian Equivalence approach. They
perform simulations attempting to determine the magnitude of the aggregate marginal
propensity to consume out of a temporary tax cut. In order to do so, they extend
Blanchard's (1985) model by specifying the existence of two types of economic
agents: those with low productivity (and hence, wages) who have no access to
borrowing against their Mure wages, and those with high productivity and wages, who
are assumed to be able to borrow. In a Ricardian scenario (with perfect capital
markets), the marginal propensity to consume out of a temporary tax cut is equal to
zero. When capital markets are perfect but there is a positive probability of death,
Hubbard and Judd estimate Blanchard's (1985) consumption function, for which they
show the simulated marginal propensity to consume is positive but of a negligible
order of magnitude. The model is then extended such that 20% of the labour force is
assumed to be liquidity constrained. With this extension there is found to be more
than a quadrupling in the value of the marginal propensity to consume. Hubbard and
Judd attribute this result to the fact that consumption equals the wage for low..
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productivity workers, so that for them a tax cut is met with a marginal propensity to
consume equal to unity. The Ricardian Equivalence, according to Hubbard and Judd,
will therefore, fail in an economy were credit rationing operates.
B. Differing borrowing rates. A further concem highlighted by critics of the Ricardian
view is the high probability of government being able to borrow at lower rates than a
number of private sector economic agents because a government can pool risks in a
way that is not available to private econorTlic agents (Barro, 1989).
The concem here is that economic agents with poor collateral, for example,
households and home industries (Group A), may have to pay higher interest rates
(discount rates) than government and economic agents with good collateral (large
businesses and pension funds) and (Group B), such that r* (Group A's interest rate)
< r (Group B's interest rate). Say, for example, the taxes are reduced by the
government who finances the deficit through borrowing. The wealth effects will be
zero for economic agents who can borrow rate r (Group B) but will be positive for
those borrowing at r* (Group A). This will mean that the members of Group A are now
in a better position because the tax reduction effectively allows them to borrow at a
lower interest rate r*. This reduction in the effective borrowing rate will tend to
motivate economic agents in this group to increase their current consumption and
investment demand. This will mean that desired national savings have declined and,
interest rates will have to increase to restore the savings-investment balance. In other
words, the real interest rate r*, which applies to Group A, will have to rise in order to
encourage these economic agents to hold additional public debt. If this is the case,
the crowding out of consumption and investment of Group B will occur. For Group A,
however, the opportunity to raise current consumption and investment means that the
rate of time preference for consumption will drop and the marginal return of
investment will decline, resulting in r* having to decline. So, in conclusion, the final
effect of a debt-financed tax reduction is to close the gap between rand r* and, to shift
income from Group B to Group A. Consequently, the aggregate effect on investment
may be positive or negative but it is not 'neutral'. In such a situation the Ricardian
Equivalence approach will not hold (Barro, 1989).
50
Barro (1974) does, however, address the implications that divergences among
individual discount rates will have on the Ricardian Equivalence approach. Mundell
(1971), specifically, regards differing discount rates as a source of a net wealth effect
for government bonds. He argues that, because some economic agents face higher
discount rates than others, the taxes Vlhich finance the government debt will not be
fully capitalized - hence, the issue of government bonds in this situation will be
associated with a net 'Health effect. Barro sho'NS that, to the extent that the public debt
issue entails a loan from low-discount-rate to high-discount-rate economic agents, a
positive net 'Nealth effect results only if the government is more efficient than the
private market in carrying out this kind of loan. If the govemment is more efficient only
over a certain range, and if the public choice process determines the amount of
govemment debt issue in concurrence with an efficiency criteria, it is again true (at the
margin) that the net wealth effect of government debt via the issue of bonds is zero,
despite the existence of 'imperfect capital markets'.
C. Differing transaction costs. The argument here is that if government faces lower
transaction costs than the private sector in arranging loans, then the Ricardian
Equivalence approach will tend to fail (Seater, 1993).
Yotsuzuka (1987), in defence of the Ricardian view, points out that in order to ensure
the invalidation of the Ricardian Equivalence approach, one has to assume that
government is more efficient than the private sector at providing de facto loans.
D. The issue of government debt and liqUidity. Gowland (1985) highlights yet
another situation were the Ricardian Equivalence approach may not hold. Gowland
notes that an increase in the value of national debt (created by a current tax cut) will
embody an iIliquid liability to the government whereas an increase in money holdings
or bond holdings of the individual will increase liquidity. This is an important point as
it highlights the fact that even though real net wealth will remain the same in all three
financing options (increased current taxation, a debt for tax swop and money
creation), the latter too (a debt for tax soop and money creation) will cause increased
consumption induced by increased liquidity.
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embody an illiquid liability to the government whereas an increase in money holdings
or bond holdings of the individual will increase liquidity. This is an important point as
it highlights the fact that even though real net wealth will remain the same in all three
financing options (increased current taxation, a debt for tax S'NOP and money
creation), the latter two (a debt for tax swop and money creation) will cause increased
consumption induced by increased liquidity.
Consequently, after considering some of the market imperfections that may invalidate
the Ricardian Equivalence approach, an important deduction appears to be that the
issue of public debt may be a useful form of financial intermediation in the sense that
govemment can induce economic agents with good access to credit markets to hold
more than their share of debt. Those with poor access hold less than their share, and
thereby effectively receive loans from the first group, and this is an important
consideration not considered by the traditional analysis (Barro, 1989).
In conclusion, one of the key issues with regards to the role of market imperfections
('Nhether it involves credit rationing or differential borrowing rate) on the validity of the
Ricardian Equivalence approach, appears to be what caused the market imperfections
to occur. This is so because, the general finding of the investigations into the role of
market imperfections, is that, if the introduction of govemment debt creates a situation
which private markets could not have established on their ovvn then the Ricardian
Equivalence approach will tend to fail, and the introduction of government debt will
have real consequences on the economy (Seater, 1993).
8. The assumption of lump-sum taxation
The Ricardian Equivalence approach appears to depend on the assumption of non-
distortionary taxation or that taxes are lump-sum, and this is unlikely to be the case
in reality. In reality taxes are likely to be positively related to income, and in most
cases progressively sa, therefore one needs to analyse what effect the dropping of
this assumption will have on the predictions of the Ricardian Equivalence approach.
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The assumption of lump-sum taxation is an important one as it implies that taxes are
not a function of income and hence eliminates any income or substitution effects
marginal taxation may have had. The dropping of this assumption does not, however,
necessarily lead to the Ricardian Equivalence approach being invalidated. This can
be shown as follovvs : - if one assumes that taxes are not lump-sum but rather income
taxes, and there is a drop in the income tax rate (on labour) in period 1 (t1) financed
by a budget deficit. There will, therefore, be an increase in the income tax in period
2 (12). Economic agents will be stimulated (as taxes are levied on labour income) into
'NOrking more than usual in period 1 and less in period 2 (this will clearly depend on
the substitution of leisure for labour). Consequently, since the tax rate does not apply
to expenditures, the desired national savi gs will increase in the first period and,
decline in the second period and, interest rates will decline during the period when
govemment is running a deficit and, increase in the second period when when higher
taxes are being levied. Clearly, this effect is contrary to those suggested by the
Keynesian view on budget deficits but ,it needs to be said, these results are not
entirely consistent with the Ricardian view.
However, if one looks at the insurance aspect of postponed taxes levied on future
generations, the Ricardian Equivalence approach does not seem to hold. Consider
the following, taxes are an increasing function of income (a likely situation in the real
'NOrld), instead of the lump-sum as assumed by Barro (1974) and, that future incomes
are uncertain. A current tax rate reduction (which suggests a higher future tax rate),
will reduce the variance (and, consequently, the uncertainty) of future incomes. As a
result of this, economic agents will be inclined to cut their amount of saving as they
no longer have to save as much for insurance purposes and, consequently, there will
be an increase in current consumption (Yotsuzuka, 1987). This would suggest that the
Ricardian Equivalence approach would not hold if taxes are not lump-sum, and taxes
are unlikely to be lump-sum in the real world.
9. Distributional Issues
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Buchanan (1976) draws attention to the fact that Barro (1974), in his paper 'Are
Government Bonds Net Wealth ?, presupposes that the economic agents purchasing
the government bonds are the same economic agents on whom the alternative taxes
will be levied.
To illustrate this, let us consider the following, the benefits of a current reduction in
taxes could go primarily to Group A. However, the higher future taxes implied by the
current reduction in taxes are likely to be incurred mainly by Group B. In such a
situation, those economic agents in Group A will consider at least some proportion of
the current reduction in taxes as an increase in net wealth, as they would not expect
their future tax liabilities to increase as much as the current reduction in taxes.
Consequently, government borrowing may have redistributive effects, in that those in
the top income bracket are those who hold government bonds, while the majority of
income groups are subject to taxation (Seater, 1993). Should these aggregate effects
occur it would tend to suggest the failure of the Ricardian Equivalence approach.
This issue is of particular importance to an economy such as South Africa, a country
characterised by huge inequalities in income and wealth. McGrath (1979) highlights
this issue in his study when he finds that a considerable redistribution of income
occurs via government taxation and expenditure polices.
10. Uncertainty of future tax and income levels
Although the role of uncertainty on the validity of the Ricardian Equivalence approach
appears unclear, at first glance, it could well in fact have a very significant role to play.
What has been suggested here is that because future tax liabilities tend to be
uncertain (and therefore, increase uncertainty about future disposable income), there
is a higher rate of discount associated with their capitalization, that is, a higher rate
of discount is used in determining their present value (Feldstein, 1988). Consequently,
(
some authors have argued that a reduction in taxes will have net wealth effects
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(because the present value of the higher expected future taxes falls short of the
current reduction in tax), thus raising aggregate demand and reducing national saving
and therefore, invalidating the Ricardian Equivalence approach which suggests that
there will be no wealth effects associated with a debt for tax swop.
Barro (1989 p. 45) has a different opinion. He believes that although budget deficits
tend to increase the uncertainty about future disposable income and, economic agents
will tend to react to this by making risk-averting decisions about their current
consumption and saving - therefore, according to Barro, economic agents will tend to
reduce current consumption and hence, increase current saving by more than the
current tax reduction and, consequently, the wealth effects associated with a debt for
tax S'NOP will tend to be negative. Barro argues that a proper treatment of uncertainty
(Chan (1983) study for example), will lead to very different conclusions to those
suggested by the traditional view.
A. Uncertainty about the real value of future tax ~iabilities. Chan (1983), considers
a situation where taxes are lump-sum and have a kno'M1 (and fixed) distribution
across households. However, he also assumes in this scenario, that the aggregate
level of future taxes and the real value of future liabilities (payments) on public debt
are subject to uncertainty. Chan (p. 353) finds that in such a situation a debt for tax
swop will have no real effects on the economy, and the Ricardian Equivalence
approach remains an appropriate interpretation of the impact of public debt on the
economy. This outcome is seen to occur because economic agents will hold their
share of extra debt because the issue of public debt in this situation is seen to be a
good hedge against the uncertainty of future taxes.
B. Uncertainty about the tax incidence across individuals. Chan (1983 p. 359)
then expands his study to consider the following scenario:- suppose now that future
taxes are lump-sum but have an uncertain incidence across individuals (this
assumption creates the possibility that a households share of the current tax cut does
not match its share of the future tax increase, causing it to revise its planned
consumption). If one additionally assumes that there are no insurance markets for
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relative tax risks, then a budget deficit in such circumstances will tend to increase the
uncertainty about each individual's future disposable income. Chan shows that in this
constructed situation of non-increasing absolute risk, individuals will react by reducing
current consumption, and hence, increase private saving by more than the tax cut.
Consequently, the traditional view of the consequences of uncertainty on aggregate
demand, interest rates, investment and the current account has certainly been
discredited by Chan's findings. But what impact they have on the Ricardian
Equivalence approach (which requires a neutral effect) is less clear. Chan's (1983)
findings for a change in income tax are, however, different and tend to support the
traditional view.
C. Uncertainty about future disposable income. An example of this type of study
is as follo'NS: suppose that each individual in an economy pays the tax ay1, (where Y1
is the person's uncertain future income). Furthermore, if one assumes that there are
no insurance markets for individual income risks and that a is known, then if
government runs a deficit in such a situation, the future value of a is raised and this
will reduce the uncertainty about each individual's future disposable income. That is,
government will share the risks about individual disposable income to a greater
extent, and private saving will tend to rise by less than the tax cut. Consequently, the
traditional view of budget deficits will tend to be ratified in such a situation
(Barro,1989).
D. Uncertainty about after tax income. Barsky, Mankiwand Zeldes (1986) also
consider deviations from the Ricardian view that arise due to uncertainty about future
taxes. In particular, they focus on conditic>ns under which a tax cut and debt issue
increases risk sharing and thus leads to a reduction in individual uncertainty about
after tax income. Thus, there is a positive marginal propensity to consume out of a tax
cut because the cut reduces precautionary saving. Obviously, a key assumption in the
analysis is that by increasing further taxes (matching the current tax cut) government
provides insurance to individuals that is not available in the private market. Under
plausible assumptions regarding preferences and the extend of income uncertainty,
the authors simulations deliver non negligible marginal propensities to consume out
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of a tax cut - for example, 0.3 or 0.5. Thus, they claim that even though economic
agents are Ricardian as they fully discount future tax liabilities and consumption does
react to the current tax cut owing to its effect on uncertainty. Again, a key assumption
used in generating this effect is that there are no markets through which agents can
insure against future income risk.
Aptly, Barro (1989) concludes that the evidence on uncertainty appears to depend on
the net effect of higher mean future tax collections on the uncertainty associated with
an individual's disposable income. This is so because, desired national saving tends
to rise with a budget deficit if this uncertainty rises, thus validating the Ricardian view.
This effect will also operate in the opposite direction.
E. Uncertainty and the bequest motive. Another consideration is the effect of
uncertainty on the bequest motive. Seater (1993) highlights the fact that if individuals
are uncertain about their future disposable income they will also be uncertain about
the amount of bequests they will want to make. This 'will result in the individual being
indifferent between an additional Rand today and a future payment to his or her
child(ren) that has a present value of a Rand. In such an instance the Ricardian
Equivalence approach will fait.
11. Interest rate/growth rate differential
The Ricardian Equivalence approach, tends to ignore the point that a difference in the
growth rate and the interest rate in an economy may result in a situation were a
govemment can issue government debt via bonds but wHl not be required to repay it
at a later date. This highlights the point that, if the economy grows at a higher rate
than the real interest rate then, future taxes may not have to be increased by as much
in order to repay the debt. As tax revenue is a function of income, and if income is
growing faster than (or at the same rate as) the rate of interest then this higher tax
revenue can be used to repay some of the debt (Seater, 1993). Such a situation would
tend to invalidate the Ricardian Equivalence approach.
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12. The assumption of full-employment
The Ricardian Equivalence approach has been censured for its assumption of 'full
employment', as it cannot hold in the Keynesian model, because the Keynesians
assume that there will tend to be unemployment. In the Keynesian approach to budget
deficits, a current tax reduction results in vvealth effects and, consequently, aggregate
demand and output 'Nil! increase in response to this. Barro (1989), on the other hand,
believes that the Ricardian Equivalence approach will still hold in the Keynesian
model. In that, if the view is taken (the validity of this type of assumption in the real
world is clearly questionable) that the reduction in current taxes had no wealth effects
then, aggregate demand and output Vv'Ould not increase. Therefore, in such a situation
the Ricardian Equivalence would not seem to contradict the Keynesian approach
which highlights the fact that there will be 'under-employment' in the economy as
output has not been increased therefore, it is inconsequential to the Ricardian
analysis 'Nhether one assumes full employment or not.
13. Do economic agents behave rationally?
The Ricardian view and its depend heavily on the assumption that economic agents
are rational and 'forward-looking'. Many economists question the validity of this
assumption on various grounds. Firstly, it is questionable whether economic agents
will even be aware of their government's budgetary position. Secondly, as David
Ricardo pointed out, economic agents may be suffering from 'fiscal-illusion'. In other
'NOrds, he believed that economic agents were easily deceived and, would therefore
perceive the current tax reduction as an increase in net wealth, as they would not be
aware of the higher future tax liabilities implied by the current debt for tax swop
(O'Driscoll, 1976). Thirdly, traditional economists believe that economic agents tend
to be myopic and, will consequently, tend to make decisions in a very simplified way
(they do not always use all the information available to them when making their
decisions), which is not in line with the rather complicated rational decision process
required by the Ricardian Equivalence approach (Mankiw and Scarth, 1995).
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Consequently, the issue of the decision making process of economic agents, has
been the focus of various statistical studies, the findings of 'Nhich will be discussed
in the next section (4.5).
3.3 Conclusion
Despite the Ricardian Equivalence approach's dependence on a number of strong
(and often very restrictive) assumptions, a review of the criticisms levied against its
operation as well as the counter-arguments to those criticisms, indicates that the
Ricardian Equivalence approach is by no means an immaterial theory into the
implications of a bond-financed budget deficit on an economy. It does, however,
appear that there are number of reasons 'Nhy the Ricardian Equivalence approach
may not hold - some are very influential and important and others trivial. Finite
horizons, non-altruistic or nonoperative bequest motives, childless couples, liquidity
constraints, and uncertainty, all can lead to the failure of the Ricardian Equivalence
approach, and it is logical to presume that one or more of these will operate in the
economy at anyone time. Consequently, on purely theoretical grounds, it does appear
that the Ricardian Equivalence approach will not hold. According to Seater (1993),
this is not to say that the Ricardian view could not be a good approximation of 'Nhat
occurs in reality, as the empirical research indicates that there is considerable
evidence in favour of the Ricardian view. In order to evaluate Seater's claims one
must review the empirical evidence on the Ricardian Equivalence approach, an
overview of the empirical evidence is provided in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
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CHAPTER FOUR
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND OBSERVATIQN
4.1 I.ntroduction
Barro's (1974) article 'Are Government Bonds Net Wealth ?' resulted in a renewed
interest into the consequences of public debt on economies, and this interest resulted
in a substantial amount of empirical research on the validity of the Ricardian
Equivalence. The review of the empirical research on the Ricardian Equivalence
approach in this dissertation has been divided into two broad categories. Firstly,
research that tests the issues that have relevance to the Ricardian Equivalence
approach. This research attempts to empirically measure the validity of some of the
theoretical objections levied against the Ricardian Equivalence approach (many of
v.A1ich \#Vere considered in chapter 3.2). This category of research is often labelled as
'indirect evidence'. The second type of research is 'direct evidence', which attempts
to test the predictions of the Ricardian view. This chapter attempts to provide an
overview of how these empirical studies were formulated (including an examination
of some of the statistical measurement and methodological issues) and to determine
whether the findings of these studies reaffirrn or invalidate the Ricardian view. Due to
the considerable amount of literature on this topic, this overview is limited to the
studies which best illustrate the different types of analysis that have been undertaken.
4.2 Indirect evidence
1. Consumer Behaviour
Seater (1993) places emphasis on the fact that the Ricardian Equivalence approach
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is based on (and is in part an extension of) the Permanent-lncome/Life-Cycle
Hypothesis (PILCH), as the Ricardian view seems to incorporate a very similar
formulation of consumer behaviour. Clearly, if the PILCH is invalidated by empirical
research, then one would have to question the validity of the Ricardian Equivalence
approach itself. Empirical research has been informative in that it has highlighted a
number of empirical problems as well as strengths of the PILCH.
A. The PILCH and savings. The PILCH suggests that if economic agents are saving
a small proportion of the change in their income, then they are confident about their
future income. Initially, the empirical evidence appears to support this view, in that
savings do appear to increase prior to recession and decline prior to a boom.
HOVvever, on further investigation the empirical evidence on saving does not entirely
validate the PILCHts prediction on saving, as saving does not appear to change as
much, as it is not as sensitive to changes in the expectations of future economic
environment, as the PILCH would predict. These findings, according to Campbell
(1987), could be the result of either the expectations of economic agents being non-
rational, or point to the existence of borrowing constraints in an economy. If either
case is true, and economic agents do not save in a manner consistent with the PILCH,
then the validity of the Ricardian Equivalence approach is drawn into question as this
approach requires that economic agents change their saving decisions to completely
compensate future generations for the higher future tax liabilities implied by the
current debt for tax swop.
The PILCH also suggests that retired individuals will tend to dissave in their retirement
years but the empirical evidence on the validity of this view is, however, inconclusive
in that some studies find this not to be the case35 and others find that the elderly do
in fact save in a way consistent with what the P1LCH predicts. There are authors who
contend that, although retired individuals dissave less than what is required by the
3S The vvork of Bernheim (1987) is an example.
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PILCH, this does not automatically invalidate the PILCH because the reason for this
may be linked to the uncertainty of lifespan and income issues not considered by the
PILCH (Davies, 1981 p. 561).
B. The PILCH and the response of consumption to changes in debt. Poberta
(1988) finds that consumption does not appear to respond to anticipated changes in
policy, but rather it only responds once the policy is in place. Poberta believes that his
results suggest one of tvvo things - either economic agents are myopic or liquidity
constrained. Poberta's explanation of why economic agents may not be able to
behave in a rational manner, as required by the PILCH, certainly makes sense if one
considers the point that severe credit rationing will have a considerable impact on
economic agent's ability to respond optimally to expected changes in income and
hence consumption, as they will not be able to borrow the funds which would have
enabled them to do so.
This kind of 'delayed' behaviour is inconsistent with the PILCH, which requires that
economic agents are rational (and, consequently, behave in an optimal manner) and,
consequently, take appropriate action today to events that they expect to occur in the
future. Although Poberta's focus is on consumption, his results indirectly suggest that
economic agents will not optimally change their current saving levels to account for
the higher future tax liabilities implied by the current debt for tax S'NOp. Poberta's
research findings therefore, indirectly invalidate the Ricardian Equivalence approach,
which requires that economic agents increase their current savings levels so as to
provide the funds to repay the higher future tax liability implied by the current debt for
tax swop.
C. The PILCH and its predictions about the sensitivity of consumption to
temporary changes in income. Many studies have investigated the 'excess
sensitivity'36 of consumption, and have found that consumption is more sensitive to
36 The response of consumption to current income beyond that attributable
to the role of current income in signalling changes in permanent income
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temporary changes in income than the PILCH suggestion that the 'excess sensitivity'
of consumption is zero.
Wilcox (1989) in his analysis of the impact of changes in social security benefits on
aggregate demand finds that there is evidence to support an 'excess sensitivity' of
consumption to temporary changes in income. Furthermore, his study indicates that
consumption does not only increase for predicted increases in benefits (for example,
income) as the PILCH would suggest, but also for unpredictable changes.
Poberta (1988) finds that consumptions response to temporary changes in taxes was
too large to be consistent with the PILCH. Poberta finds that a transitory tax cut of one
dollar, which is a result of a tax-induced increase in income, will increase consumer
spending by one-fifth as much, v.tlich is larger than that predicted by the PILCH. This
result is significant as it clearly contradicts the Ricardian view which argues that the
timing of taxes will have no effect on individuals consumption decisions and therefore
no effect on real economic activity.
O. The PILCH and consumption's response to permanent changes in income.
Flavin (1981) develops a simple model of consumption, where consumption responds
to the changes in permanent income signalled by innovations in the current income
process and to changes in current income itself. Flavin's tests show that there is
substantial evidence against the PILCH. Flavin finds, using expenditures as the
consumption variable, that the point estimate of the 'excess sensitivity' of consumption
to the current change in income is 0.335 (the hypothesis that consumption exhibits no
excess sensitivity to current income is seen to be rejected at the 0.5 percent level).
Flavin regards this result as conclusive evidence against the PILCH since nondurable
goods represent only a small fraction of total expenditure - a point estimate of 0.355
therefore represents a large departure from the PILCH.
E. The PILCH and economic agents planning horizons. The PILCH and the
is termed 'excess sensitivity' of consumption to current income.
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Ricardian view assume that economic agents have a planning horizon that extends
over their entire expected lifetimes. The validity of this assumption which was drawn
into question by a study done by Khayum and Baffoe-Bonnie (1994). This was tested
by applying a 'moving planning horizon model' to Ghana, Kenya, Jamaica and the
Philippines (all developing countries). A moving planning horizon tests the assumption
that the planning horizon of economic agents does not expand over their entire
expected lifetimes. If this is the case, then economic agents will not base their
decisions on the value of their permanent incomes. Khayum and Baffoe-Bonnie find
that economic agents' planning horizons range from four months (Ghana) to just over
ten months (Jamaica). Given these results, it is doubtful whether the planning horizon
by the PILCH and the Ricardian view is correct, as it appears to be far too long. It is
important to note however, that the planning horizons of economic agents in more
developed economies is likely to be longer than that in less developed economies.
However, it is doubtful that planning horizons will extend over their entire lifetimes
even in the case of developed countries. Given Khayum and Baffoe-Bonnie findings,
one has to doubt whether the Ricardian Equivalence approach is indeed a relevant
theory in reality.
F. The PILCH and expectation formulation. Feldstein (1982) refers to another
possible weakness of the PILCH - that economic agents may formulate expectations
in a way inconsistent with that required by the PILCH. Feldstein notes that an
increased level of government spending may induce economic agents to expect a
higher level of government spending in the next year (as economic agents will believe
that this process once embarked on is unlikely to be reversed) and, will consequently,
anticipate higher levels of future taxation to finance this higher level of government
expenditure to continue on into the following year. This type of expectation formation
is also not consistent with the Ricardian view. It requires that economic agents not
expect higher future government expenditure (and, consequently, taxes) to continue
into future periods because there is an increase in the current level of government
expenditure (which is an adaptive expectation formulation method) but, rather
formulate their expectations in a rational manner (that is, they use all the information
available when formulating their expectations).
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G. The PILCH and the rational behaviour of economic agents. Tanzi (1985) points
out that the PllCH and the Ricardian Equivalence approach require that economic
agents must not only be forward-looking but also rational. In other words, economic
agents must not only anticipate future taxes implied by outstanding government debt
but must also respond to it. Tanzi believes that economic agents will save extra
income inferred by a current tax cut only if their current level of consumption is not
reduced. Furthermore, Tanzi finds that if economic agents view the deficit as only a
temporary phenomenon they may not adjust their current levels of consumption to
accommodate it. Consequently, economic agents will not behave in a manner
consistent with the Ricardian view, and a deficit is such circumstances will be
associated with some crowding out of investment due to higher interest rates (Tanzi,
1985).
In conclusion, if one accepts the relationship between the PllCH and the Ricardian
Equivalence approach, then it appears that the PllCH, and hence the Ricardian
Equivalence approach, have a number of empirical deficiencies associated with them.
This follovvs from the fact that a number of the predictions about how economic agents
will respond to changes in economic variables, implied the PllCH do not appear to
be corroborated by empirical research. It is however, important to point out that the
empirical evidence itself is by no means categorical, as different studies attempting
to analyse the same issue have had very divergent results. Furthermore, if one
objects to the view that the PILCH and the Ricardian view are correlated, then it is
even less clear as to Yttlat conclusions one can drawn from the empirical evidence in
this area.
2. Intergenerational 'Altruistic' Bequests
Even if one concludes that the evidence on consumer behaviour is inconclusive, the
Ricardian view has been drawn into question on other grounds, in particular, its
apparent dependence on the existence of the 'altruistic' bequest motive.
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A. The prevalence of bequests. Before one addresses the issue of altruistic
bequests, one needs to ascertain whether bequests are made at all. Kotlikoff and
Summers (1981) attempt to address this question and find evidence that suggests that
bequests betvJeen generations do occur to a considerable extent in the United States.
They find that about 80 percent of household vvealth can be traced to bequests rather
than to accumulation over time. Modigliani (1988) however, has a finding of only 15
percent and therefore, the exact extent at which bequests take place is debateable.
Nevertheless, the important point is that bequests do appear to take place at a
significant level.
Even though the empirical evidence suggests that economic agents do appear to
leave bequests, this evidence provides no insight into what the motivation behind
those bequests could be.
B. The motivation behind the bequest provision. Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers
(1985) attempt to test whether there is an 'altruistic' motive for bequests, and find that
the Ricardian view of the bequest motive is incorrect. They find that bequests are
often used as a form of compensation to the beneficiaries for services they have
rendered. Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers do not suggest that parents ,are not
altruistic and do not care about the utility of their children, but rather that they would
also prefer to receive some kind of gift, perhaps attention, for their having bequeathed
their wealth to their children. Consequently, the Ricardian view and its dependence
on there being an altruistic bequest motive seems to be invalidated by the Bernheim,
Shleifer and Summers study since, if bequests are a strategic device used by parents
in an attempt to control the behaviour of their children, then they are unlikely to adjust
the value of bequests in the face of changes (a decline) in the future welfare of their
children implied by the current debt for tax swop.
The Bernheim Shleifer and Summers study can however, be questioned, in that the
data used for analysis was concerned primarily with the behaviour of the children, yet
the model that they construct is primarily concerned with extracting conclusions about
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the behaviour of parents (Seater, 1993). In the light of this, one could say that the
Bemheim
J
Shleifer and Summers analysis provides insight into the motives of children
towards their parents, but, is insufficient evidence to invalidate the Ricardian
Equivalence, as it does not specifically address the question of whether bequests
made by parents are motivated by altruism or not (Seater, 1993).
In general, the findings in this area are mixed, but they do highlight that non-altruistic
bequests do occur, but the prevalence of such non-altruistic bequests is not known
and therefore, no categorical conclusion can be made about the validity of the
Ricardian view that the majority of bequests are motivated by altruism.
3. Liquidity Constraints
The issue of liquidity constraints is one which is often used to cast doubt over the
validity of the Ricardian Equivalence approach, which assumes that there are no
liquidity constraints. The presence of liquidity constraints is seen to hamper the ability
of economic agents to behave as they 'M)uld wish to. This is an important requirement
for the operation of the Ricardian Equivalence approach as if economic agents are
liquidity constrained they will not be able to behave optimally as required by the
Ricardian Equivalence approach.
A. The prevalence of liquidity constraintsr Hall and Mishkin (1982), using the Panel
StUdy of Income Dynamics, estimate that 20% of United States families are liquidity
constrained. Cox and Jappelli (1990), using data on individuals that have been denied
credit, find similar results to Hall and Mishkin (1982) in that 12 to 18 percent of all
individuals in the United States are liquidity constrained. Cox and Jappelli also
examine whether the existence of private transfers between households and family
members would reduce the extent of liquidity constraints in the economy. Their
findings show that only about one-fifth of all liquidity-constrained households would
receive such a transfer and consequently they argue that the existence of liquidity
constraints in an economy appears highly probable.
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The empirical evidence, therefore, suggests that a significant number of economic
agents are liquidity constrained, but the magnitude of that effect on aggregate
behaviour is unclear. Even if one assumes that liquidity constraints do have a
considerable effect on aggregate consumption, this does not necessarily imply that
the Ricardian view has been invalidated as one still has to ascertain why those
constraints exist. It is only if those constraints are a direct result of the introduction of
govemment debt into the economy that the Ricardian Equivalence approach will tend
to fail.
B. Sources of liquidity constraints and the introduction of government debt.
Hayashi (1982) investigates the correlation among consumption, wealth, and income
for various population groups and finds that liquidity constraints are more important
for younger families with low levels of wealth and saving. This finding is particularly
significant if one is considering the role of liquidity constraints as a possible
impediment to the operation of the Ricardian Equivalence approach in a South African
context, as South Africa is a country where a significant proportion of the population
is very young. It follows therefore, that if Hayashi (1985) is correct and liquidity
constraints severely impair an agent's ability to function in a manner required by the
Ricardian view, then it seems unlikely that the Ricardian Equivalence approach will
operate in the South African economy.
In defence of the Ricardian view, Yotsuzuka (1987) also addresses this issue in a
study V'A1ere he uses three different models, each with varying assumptions about the
level of communication between the agents in the model. Initially, he proposes that
there is no communication between lenders. This assumption implies that a potential
borrower can have loan contracts with other lenders unknovvn to the current lender.
He then assumes that there is fun communication, which implies that lenders will have
full information about all the contract purchases of a potential borrower. Finally,
Yotsuzuka incorporates the incentive for the lenders to communicate. Communication
in this model is, consequently, endogenous. Yotsuzuka finds that debt was non-
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neutral in the first t'NO scenarios37• This finding suggests that it is possible to achieve
a Pareto-improvement via a debt-financed tax-cut. However, in the third scenario
(vvhere communication is assumed endogenous, thereby eliminating the incredulous
assumptions of the first tvvo scenarios) Yotsuzuka finds that the Ricardian Equivalence
approach is indeed valid and a Pareto-improvement cannot be achieved via a bond-
financed budget deficit. Furthermore, Yotsuzuka's (1987) results suggest that the
presence of adverse selection, which often result in credit rationing, does not
automatically eliminate the Ricardian Equivalence approach.
Conclusion
It appears that the indirect evidence on the validity of the Ricardian Equivalence
approach is essentially inconclusive, since their results are dubious due to the fact
that in many of the studies vital components are missing (Seater, 1993). The evidence
from the investigation of the validity of the PllCH however, does seem to suggest the
failure of the Ricardian Equivalence approach. In general the indirect evidence
indicates that further investigation into the importance of non altruistic bequests and
liquidity constraints on the validity of the Ricardian view is required.
4.3 Direct evidence
Econometric evidence on the validity of the Ricardian view is divergent, and at first
glance largely inconclusive, but if one takes into account the errors of methodology
often inherent in these studies, patterns and coherence does seem to emerge (Seater,
1993). Seater (p. 160) argues that direct evidence is very informative and provides
considerable insight into the relevance of the Ricardian view.
Difficulty was found with the process of testing the Ricardian Equivalence approach
econometrically, as it is a process susceptible to errors of measurement, specification,
37
Although the Ricardian Equivalence approach may hold locally in the
second test (Yotsuzuka, 1987).
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differencing, simultaneity and data stationarity. Consequently, Seater (p. 160)
concludes that one needs to address the relevant measurement and methodological
issues before one can look at the empirical studies and their results in a critical and
reliable manner.
i.) Measurement Errors. Empirical studies of the Ricardian Equivalence approach
often prove inaccurate and inconclusive as they do not utilize the proper
measurement of the variables of importance to the study.
Studies of the Ricardian Equivalence approach often use the federal component of
the debt, without including state and local debt data in their regressions38.
Furthermore, many studies fail to convert nominal values to real market values. This
is an important deficiency as not accounting for inflation can prove highly distortionary
(Seater 1993 p. 160).
The measurement of expectations is another potential dilemma in econometric
studies. The Ricardian view requires that economic agents are forward-looking so that
economic agents have expectations about income, taxes and government purchases.
.Consequently, expectations should have been incorporated into any model testing the
validity of the Ricardian Equivalence approach. How this should be done is rather
controversial, but the general thinking is that one should include distributional lags of
the relevant past variables (Seater p. 164).
H.) Specification Errors. Specification errors often result when a model other than
the 'correct' model, is estimated (Gujarati, 1992). The concern here is that the model
either omits relevant variables or includes unnecessary variables, which will lead to
biased estimates. For example, Seater (1993 p. 162) argues that empirical studies on
38 Most of the studies on the Ricardian Equivalence approach focuses on
the U.S.A, therefore a distinction between federal, state and local debt is
made.
70
the Ricardian Equivalence approach often omit govemment purchases
39
and marginal
tax rates which have a significant impact on consumption behaviour.
iii.) Differencing. This methodological issue is concerned with how the 'trend' is
treated by the study. That is, it is important in any study to determine whether the
trend is deterministic or random. This distinction is important in that it makes a
considerable difference to how the data is analysed and interpreted.
iv.) Simultaneity. A consumption function 'Nhich includes variables that are
endogenous (for example, income, marginal tax rates, interest rates, tax revenue,
transfers the unemployment rate) will mean that the estimation should be done using
simultaneous methods (Seater, 1993 p. 163).
v.) Data Stationarity. The time-series data used in estimating consumption function
models is generally non:stationary. Furthermore, the non-stationarity of the data is
often overlooked by models testing the Ricardian Equivalence approach(Dalamagas,
1994). A time series (Xt) will be stationary when its mean, E(Xt) is independent of its
time period (t), its variance E[Xt - E(, )]2 has a set boundary and does not vary
systematically with time. Consequently, a stationary data set will tend to return to the
mean and fluctuate around it within a certain range. If a non-stationary series is
differenced it will become stationary. Once this has been done, it can be included in
the regression model (Kennedy 1995).
Now, having considered the measurement and methodological problems inherent in
testing the Ricardian Equivalence, an evaluation of the two major methods of testing
the validity of the Ricardian Equivalence approach(those being consumption models
~nd interest models) as well as some of the less conventional methods may provide
further insight into the accuracy of the Ricardian Equivalence approach in explaining
and predicting the real 'NOrld impact of bond-financed budget deficits on economies.
39 And often fail to make the important distinction of whether these changes
are transitory or permanent in nature.
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1. Consumption Function Models
The estimation of a time-series consumption function is the most commonly used
method for testing the Ricardian Equivalence approach. The consumption test
literature can be divided into three groupings -life-cycle models, Euler equation tests
and permanent income models.
A. A life-cycle model. Feldstein's (1982) study is an example of a life-cycle model.
Feldstein studies the effect of changes in government spending, transfers and taxes
on aggregate demand and, interprets his results clearly contradict the Ricardian
Equivalence approach. Yet on closer inspection the Feldstein results tend to be quite
inconclusive.
Feldstein estimates an aggregate consumption function. The specific framework
Feldstein uses is a consumer expenditure function relating real per capita consumer
expenditures to a measure of real permanent income, to real wealth (as





Wt =the value of privately owned wealth beginning at period t,
SSWt =a measure of the value of the future social security benefits,
Gt =total government purchases,
Tt =total tax revenue,
T~ =government transfers to individuals,
0t =the net debt of federal, state and local governments,
So =the coefficients to be estimated.
72
Feldstein (p. 4) believes that the Ricardian Equivalence approach infers five
hypotheses about the coefficients in equation (23). Each implication refers to the
effect of a given fiscal variable on consumer spending and the five hypothesis which
Feldstein (p. 9) believes encapsulate the Ricardian view are the following:
1.) 84 < 0, this suggests that an increase in government spending (ceteris
paribus) must induce a reduction in consumer spending. The Ricardian
Equivalence approach suggests that 84 is negative, but is qUite small,
since it reflects the first year's response of households to a one Rand
decrease in the wealth of a taxpayer whose economic life is infinite.
The reason why consumer spending decreases is that government
spending substitutes for consumer spending. (Feldstein p. 9).
2.) 8s = 0, this suggests that a change in taxation (decrease) has no effect when
the levels of government spending and transfers are held constant, in
other words, a decrease in taxation increases the size of public debt
and consumer spending remains unchanged.
3.) 83 =0, this suggests that current households save all the additional wealth
made available by the debt for tax swop so as to compensate future
generations completely for their extra tax burdens.
4.) -B2 =B7, since the overall wealth variable (~) includes the value of the public
debt, it implies that a separate debt variable should have a coefficient
that is negative but equal in magnitude to the coefficient of total
variable wealth (Feldstein p. 11).
5.) B6 =0, this suggests that an increase in transfer payments financed by a
government deficit should have no effect on current consumption. This
is so because, the current transfer payments are comparable to a
reduction in taxes. Consequently, while households currently have
more spendable income, they also have a higher future tax liability, and
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must therefore, increase current saving to compensate for this.
Accordingly the effect of an increase in transfer payments will have no
effect on current consumption levels.
Feldstein then estimates equation (23) using ordinary least squares (OLS) and then
two-stage least squares (2SLS) to test whether the hypotheses hold true40.
Feldstein finds four of the five OLS tests are consistent with the Ricardian
Equivalence, the null hypothesis is accepted. In particular, Feldstein finds a very large
coefficient on government transfers, 86 = 1.206. Feldstein views this as particularly
significant as it is in sharp conflict with the Ricardian assumption of fiscal neutrality,
where 86 =0.
Feldstein (p. 13) finds four out of five of the 2SLS tests inconsistent with the Ricardian
Equivalence approach. Specifically, Feldstein's instrumental variable estimate finds
the coefficient of the government expenditure variable is very small and completely
insignificant. Furthermore, Fetdstein (p. 13) finds the coefficient of the tax variable is
now much larger, as 8s changes from -0.021 to -0.222, and the Ricardian Equivalence
hypothesis of 8s ~ 0 is rejected. Feldstein (p. 14) finds that the coefficient of the debt
variable is now very small and lends no support to the Ricardian hypothesis that 87
=-8 2' Feldstein finds the coefficient of the transfers variable remains approximately
equal to one, 86 = 1.315 and, therefore, the Ricardian Equivalence requirement of the
neutrality of fiscal policy does not hold. Finally, Feldstein finds the coefficient of the
social security vvealth variable is now positive, 83 = 0.005.
Feldstein interprets the results of the OLS tests as mixed and maintains that they give
40 2SLS is generally used in place of OLS when regressors are assumed to
be non-stochastic, in other words their values are not assumed to be
fixed in repeated sampling. This could be due to the presence of a lagged
dependant variable. A lagged dependant variable might be included
because, any changes in a variable may extend over two or more years,
and not just one.
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no clear cut conclusion about the existence of the Ricardian Equivalence approach.
On the other hand, he interprets the 2SLS test findings as a conclusive rejection of
the Ricardian Equivalence approach.
Apart from Feldstein's rather ambivalent interpretation of the results, Seater (1993
p. 166) points that there a number of other flaws in Feldstein's analysis, which leads
one to question the validity of Feldstein's results.
i.) Omitted variable bias - Feldstein (p. 14) finds a significant coefficient on 8 6 =1.315
on TR (transfers to individuals), which clearly contradicts the Ricardian requirement
that 86 = O. However, it is important to point out the fact that transfers tend to fluctuate
with the business cycle and, furthermore, are highly correlated with the marginal
income tax rates. Feldstein omitted to include both of these variables in his
regression equation. This failure could lead to an omitted variable bias and, therefore
these results and the interpretation thereof, must be regarded with caution.
ii.) Expectations formulation - Feldstein argues that, after a change in current taxation
or govemment expenditure, economic agents will adjust their expectations in the same
direction as before (that is, in an adaptive manner). This is important as it implies that
the expected future levels of government expenditure are highly correlated with the
fiscal variables (see equation (23». Despite Feldstein's view on expectation
formulation he fails to include any variables which will reflect the impact that future
govemment expenditure could have on current consumption. Aschauer (1985) points
out that the other fiscal policy variables in Feldstein's analysis may also be biased,
and thus give an inaccurate result.
iii.) Errors ofmeasurement- Seater (1993 p. 160) points out that Feldstein's analysis
contains errors of measurement, in that he uses national income or disposable income
as his income variable. It is Aschauer who points out that this may have biased the
results because national income includes both future and non-labour income as a
measure of permanent income, but future non-labour income has been incorporated
in Feldstein's analysis. Feldstein's results must thus be regarded with caution.
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iv.) Autocorrelation in data -In Feldstein's analysis he assumes that current income
is exogenous. Autocorrelation could consequently, occur in the data. Autocorrelation
is a situation where there is a correlation between members of the observations
ordered in time. This implies that the disturbance term will not be independent of
current income and, consequently biased and inconsistent estimates will appear in
OLS regression. Feldstein does however, attempt to take account of this possible
error in some of his regressions by using lagged income and taxes as instrumental
variables. Aschauer (1985, p. 120), points out that the use of these instruments may
not be an adequate measure if the bias due to serial correlation is to be eliminated.
Taking these flaws in Feldstein's analysis into account, one has to question whether
his conclusion that his study is conclusive evidence against the Ricardian
Equivalence approach, is indeed a valid one.
Seater (p. 167) points out that should Feldstein's flaws in econometric methodology
be corrected his results will be reversed41 . Despite the flaws in Fefdstein's analysis,
it is by no means oorthless. To the contrary, it was one of the first studies to recognize
an attempt to correct for the simultaneity problem. Furthermore, it was also one of the
first studies to recognise the logical generalisations that should accompany the
Ricardian Equivalence.
B. A Euler equation model. This kind of model is based on a different kind of
methodology to that of Feldstein. Aschauer (1985) utilizes the Euler equation
technique to test the Ricardian Equivalence approach. Euler equation tests are
different to conventional methodology in that an estimated Euler equation exploits
restrictions placed on data by the first-order conditions for the intertemporal
optimisation in consumption under uncertainty. Consequently, Euler equation tests
41 Seater and Mariano (1985) repeated Feldstein's regressions and
explored the importance of two of the issues raised in the critique of
Feldstein's conclusions. Seater and Mariano's (1985) results strongly
suggest that Feldstein's estimates are seriously flawed as they suffer
from misspecification and improper correction of simultaneity bias.
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'MJrk under the assumption that consumption follows a random walk process (Boskin,
1988). These kinds of tests are often informative as they avoid the issue of how to
measure expectations and permanent income, a problem experienced in Feldstein's
(1982) analysis. Difficulties, however, with specification may arise in Euler tests.
Aschauers analysis focuses primarily on the extent to which govemment expenditure
substitutes for private consumer expenditure. He is especially interested in 'Nhether
an increase in current government expenditure will relay into a lower level of
consumption expenditure in a specified period.
Aschauer starts his analysis by presenting a utility function for a representative
economic agent in terms of 'effective' consumption. The level of 'effective' demand is
represented as a linear combination of private consumption and government goods
and services, et =f!>c; + 8Gt, where ~ is private consumption in period t, and Gt is
public goods and services, and e is the constant marginal rate of substitution of Gt
and Ct (that is, to say that one unit of govemment goods and services yields the same
utility as e of private consumption).




o=the constant rate of time preference,
UO = is a time invariant, concave utility function.
Equation (24) suggests that utility is dependant on optimal consumption this period
and the next period, which is a requirement of the Ricardian Equivalence approach.
Aschauer (p. 118) then assumes that tht3 economic agent is allowed unrestricted
access to a capital market at vvhich she may choose to accumulate or not to
accumulate assets at a constant real rate of interest r.
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The economic agents flow42 budget constraint is therefore:
00 00
Where:
Wt = holdings of one-period bond holdings beginning at period ts
Nt = period t labour earnings,
r = constant rate of rear interest,
Tt = period t tax payments (net of transfers).
(25)
Equation (25) equates the present discounted value of private consumption
expenditure to initial holdings of asset holdings plus the present discounted value of
labour earnings net of tax.




Bt =govemment debt of one period maturity. Equation (26) requires that government
debt grows at a rate less than the real rate of return. Consequently, equation (26)
equates the present discounted value of tax receipts to the initial government debt
plus the present discounted value of government purchases.
Aschauer (p. 118) then assumes that the representative is rational and 'forward-
looking' in regard to the budgetary affairs of government. This assumption is vital as
42 The budget constraint is a 'flow' constraint as it describes the
consumption decision over many periods.
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it allows for an economic agent to realise the future tax liabilities inherent in a deficit
financed tax-cut. Furthermore, Aschauer assumes that the representative individual
takes into consideration the benefits to be derived from the future provision of goods
and services by the government.
These two assumptions allow the private and public sector budget constraints to be
integrated, that is, equation (25) is substituted into equation (26). Consequently, the




Thus, the present discounted value of effective consumption is constrained by the
level of net economy wide wealth (Wt - ~) plus the discounted value of labour
earnings, plus (8 - 1) times the present value of government expenditure. The last
term arises because a higher level of government spending imposes a negative
(positive) wealth effect on the representative individuals as long as 8 < (» 1.
The representative economic agents effective intertemporal utility function (24) is then
maximised subject to the effective consumption bUdget constraint (27) and the first
order necessary conditions are obtained. In order that these conditions can apply to
more than just one time period, Aschauer (p. 119) derived a Euler equation, which
takes the following form:
(28)
43 The private and public sectors are integrated by the substitution of the
govemment budget constraint into the representative individuals budget
constraint.
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The kind of preferences that economic agents are allowed to have is restricted in
equation (28), such that a closed-form solution is formulated. Aschauer (p. 119) then
assumes that the momentary utility function is quadratic such that-
u(C *1)= -(C *-c *1)2/2 (29)
Where C"t is the bliss level of 'effective' consumption. This yields the Euler equation:
* A *C l+l=CX+pC 1
Where:
a = [(r - (5)/(1 + r)C*t
~ =(1 + (5)/(1 + r)
(30)
Equation (30) implies that optimal consumption in period (t+1) is constrained by the
effective budget constraint. Substituting equation (30) into equation (27) and using




+2r-o][ I: {_l_YTN .+(8-I)G .]+(W-B)] (31)
(1 +r)2 }=o 1+r t+) t+) t t
Aschauer (p. 119) then transforms equation (31) into the model specification:
00 00
Where:
Bo=(5 - r)C*t/[r(1 + r)2]
~1 =(12 =-~5 = (16 =~7/(e -1) ~ r/(1 + r)
~3 ~ -(r + 8)/1 + r
(32)
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Where the approximations are for ~ ~ r, and B4 = O.
The specification of the consumption function (equation (32» developed by Aschauer
suggests that consumption is a function of labour earnings, bond holdings,
government purchases, tax receipts, government debt, present discounted value of
the net of tax labour earnings and the present discounted value of government
purchases. Note, that Aschauer's specification is quite different to that developed by
Feldstein's equation (23). Aschauer choose this specific technique so as to avoid the
problems and errors found in Feldstein's analysis (equation 23). He also intended to
provide further insight into the issue of the substitutability of govemment expenditure
for private consumption expenditure. By so doing, Aschauer also explores the joint
hypothesis of rational expectations and the Ricardian Equivalence approach.
Aschauer in his analysis then assumes a joint hypothesis of the Ricardian
Equivalence approach and rational expectations. Aschauer uses the Full-Information
Maximum Likelihood Procedure (FIML) to estimate the consumption function. The
basis of this method is to estimate the unknown parameters in such a way that the
probability of observing the given independent variables is as high as possible.
Initially, a particular probability distribution is assumed, and then the probability of
observing a specific outcome is calculated. Then looking at the data set, those
parameter estimates which maximise the probability of the observed outcome, are
selected. These parameter estimates are then the maximum likelihood estimates of
the unknovvn true parameter values. Therefore, Aschauer, in his analysis, initially uses
a set of cross-equation restrictions (which are a result of the assumptions of the
rational expectations hypothesis) to estimate the model. The model is then estimated
without the inclusion of the restrictions.
The parameters are estimated for both n =m =2 and n =2, m = 1, where n and m are
the number of lags. Aschauer's findings, based on the quarterly data for 1948, first
quarter, to 1981, fourth quarter, yield that the log-likelihood ratio statistic for both is
below the critical value of the chi-squared distribution. This means that the null
hypothesis is not rejected, which implies that the joint hypothesis of rational
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expectations and the Ricardian Equivalence approach hold. The point estimate of S,
the marginal rate of the substitution of government expenditure (Gt ) for private
consumption (Ct ) is approximately 0.23 in both cases. This is significant in that
Aschauer interprets this as indicating that government goods and services are
inadequate substitutes for private consumption goods. Consequently, an increase in
government expenditure is likely to result in an expansion of aggregate demand,
whether the Ricardian Equivalence approach holds or not.
Aschauer concludes that an increase in government spending will cause economic
agents to adjust their private consumption expenditure downwards. Critically, the
change will be tess than the value of the benefits they will obtain from the increase in
government expenditure.
C. Permanent income model. Seater and Mariano (1985 p. 202) present results for














= current government purchases,
=a measure of marginal tax rates,
=are the short and long term atter tax interest rates,
=tax revenue,
=transfers to individuals,
= the market value of government debt,
= social security wealth.
Equation (33) tests the tax discounting hypothesis, or whether liquidity constraints do
(not) affect consumption expenditures (Seater and Mariano).
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The specification of the consumption function (equation (33) takes the following into
consideration. If tax discounting is incomplete, then for given levels of G* and G,
consumption expenditure should be negatively related to the amount of tax revenue
currently collected. Secondly, a direct corollary to the aforementioned consideration,
is that the stock of government debt should be viewed as net wealth and
consequently, should have a positive effect on consumption. Thirdly, the stock of
social security 'Health should be similarly vievved with similar effects. Finally, it is likely
that low-income individuals are subject to greater liquidity constraints than are high-
income individuals, in which case transfer payments should be positively related to
aggregate consumption expenditures (Seater and Mariano p. 206).
The permanent income hypothesis with the Ricardian EqUivalence approach,





, bs, bs, b7 < 0
2. 0 =b2, ba, bg, b1o,
3.b11 < b1.
Seater and Mariano's estimates are consistent with the permanent income theory
generalized to include the Ricardian Equivalence approach (which is achieved via the
inclusion of the tax discounting hypothesis). In particular, none of the coefficients on
the government financing variables Tt, 1rt I Ot, and SSWt are statistically significant.
In particular, 0.51 for CETOT (total expenditure) and for 0.48 CENDS (expenditure on
non-durables plus serves), are both far below the 5% critical level (F(4.33) =2.66.
Seater and Mariano also estimated that the interest rate coefficients bs and b7 are of
opposite sign and are statistically insignificant, and that the estimated transitory..
44
45
Measures the combination of the direct marginal productivity of
government services and the indirect effect on output arising from
induced labour shifts.
Measures the substitutability of government for private goods and
services.
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income coefficient b2 is significantly positive. This result, b2 > 0, is significant in that
it suggests that transitory income has a positive effect on consumption. This effect is
seen by many theorists to occur due to the existence of liquidity constraints. However,
as mentioned before, Seater and Mariano find that the data is strongly consistent with
the tax discounting hypothesis and consequently, the data is also inconsistent with the
existence of significant liquidity constraints. Seater (1993) provides a possible solution
to this apparent anomaly. He argues that liquidity constraints may exist and thus
account for the positive coefficient on transitory income. However, these liquidity
constraints are not types which would invalidate the Ricardian Equivalence.
Seater and Mariano also test whether the omittance of the marginal tax rate in other
studies results in their models suffering from omitted variable bias. However, Seater
and Mariano's permanent income specification results are qualitatively the same as
the results they obtain from replications of Feldstein's (1982) and Kormendi's (1983)
life-cycle specifications.
Seater and Mariano also decompose government purchases into permanent and
transitory components but find no evidence that decomposition is important for
consumption, implying that other consumption studies that ignore it are not thereby
invalidated.
D. The testing of consumption function models in less developed economies.
The primary focus of much of the empirical research on the Ricardian Equivalence
approach has been on the United States. There are, however, a number of
economists that have attempted to study the potency of fiscal policy on less
developed economies and one such study is that of Dalamagas (1994) 46.
Others economists who have found empirical support for the Ricardian Equivalence
approach using consumption function tests include Barro (1974), and Kormendi and
46 Dalamagas' (1994) study will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five of
this study.
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Meguire (1986). Blanchard (1985), Feldstein (1988), and Modigliani and Sterling
(1990) however, find results that are inconsistent with the Ricardian Equivalence
approach.
2. Interest rate models
It has been argued that, by traditional economists in particular, an increase in the
issue of govemment debt (via a bond-financed budget defICit) will cause interest rates
to rise, as the increase in government debt and/or deficit is seen to have a net wealth
effect. This view is in opposition to the Ricardian view, which proposes that interest
rates will be unaffected by the increase in government debt and/or deficit, as the
Ricardian view contends that there will be no net wealth effects associated with an
increase in government debt and/or deficit. Based on these divergent predictions on
the behaviour of interest rates in response to an increase in government debt and/or
deficit, some investigators have used the behaviour of interest rates rather than the
behaviour of consumption, as a means of testing for the existence of the Ricardian
Equivalence approach.
A. Interest rate tests based on testing what impact current and past bUdget
deficits have on interest rates. Evans (1987), using monthly data from June 1908
to March 198447, in testing this issue, regresses three alternative interest rates on
current and past government expenditure budget deficits and real money supplies48.
Evans finds no significant positive connection between budget deficits and interest
rates. He also finds some of the coefficients are significantly negative and believes
that this negative bias may have arisen due to error terms being correlated with the
regressors. He then re-estimates the model using instrumental variables to correct for
the possible discrepancy. However, he finds this measure has no significant impact
on the initial results. Nor does the aggregation of the data, to correct for the errors of
47
48
Using United States data.
Evans uses either six or twelve lagged values of each variable,
depending on the length of the sample period.
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measurement that may have resulted from finely aggregated data, have any effect on
the initial results. Evans also includes regressors using expectations of future budget
deficits as a variable in the study. However, no association is found between a rise
in the interest rates and the anticipation of tax cuts. Consequently, Evans believes
that the Ricardian Equivalence approach provides a credible explanation for these
results, as current, past or future budget deficits have no affect on interest rates as
suggested by the traditional view.
B. Interest rate tests to test the importance of decomposing government
expenditure into its permanent and transitory components. Barro (1987) breaks
down government expenditure into permanent and transitory components. This is
vie'Ned as an important distinction in interest rate studies but is considered
unimportant in consumption function studies (Seater, 1993). Barro finds that 'When the
set of transitory purchases 49 are included in his model, they have a joint marginal
significance 50 (p-value) of just below 2%, while the deficit and debt variables have a
joint marginal significance of just below 10%, indicating that the latter financing
variables are jointly insignificant at conventional levels (Seater, 1993). The exclusion
of transitory purchases from in the models, however, has the effect of the deficit and
the debt variables becoming effectively more significant, both jointly and individually
(Seater, 1993 p. 175). These variables therefore, appear to replace the transitory
purchases when the latter are excluded from the model. Consequently, one can
conclude that any interest rate study which does not take account of transitory and
permanent components of government purchases must be regarded with caution.
Seater (p. 175) does, hovvever, note that Barro's study may suffer from a simultaneity
bias in that both deficit and debt variables have elements of simultaneity in them and,
therefore, must be considered with caution. Other studies of the Ricardian
49
50
Current transitory purchases and five lagged values were included in the
model.
The joint marginal significance of a set of regressors is the lowest
significance level at which the null hypothesis can be rejected.
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Equivalence approach however, have shown that the simultaneity bias does not
appear to be a serious problem,
C. Interest rates tests based on testing the relationship between steady state
interest rates and govemment purchases and debt. Blanchard's (1985) model
provides a innovative way in which to test for the existence of the Ricardian
Equivalence approach. Blanchard's model of uncertain lifetimes yields a number of
predictions about the relationship bet\Yeen steady state interest rate, on the one hand,
and the steady levels of government purchases and debt (under Ricardian and non-
Ricardian alternatives) on the other. Evans (1988) tests both the predictions, made
in Blanchard's model (as an alternative) and the Ricardian view, about the relationship
between government debt and interest rates. Using quarterly postwar data, Evans
finds no support for Blanchard's alternative model and, therefore concludes that the
Ricardian Equivalence approach (which maintains that a debt for tax S\NOP will have
no effect on interest rates) is a fair approximation.
D, Interest rate tests based on term structure theory. Seater (1993 p. 175) claims
that the best tests on the validity of the Ricardian Equivalence approach, and its
predictions about the relationship between government debt and interest rates, are
those based on term structure theory. These kinds of tests utilise the Rational
Expectations Theory of the term structure (or capital market efficiency) to test the
effect of unexpected changes in govemment debt on the abnormal return on financial
assets. The abnormal return is the difference between the expected and actual
holding period return on an asset, and the holding return is the percentage change
in the asset's price between two adjacent periods (Seater p. 176). In an efficient
market, the expected rate of return must equal the one-period interest rate.
Furthermore, a key issue in this kind of model is the fact that the abnormal return can
be influenced by new information. Not all new information will influence asset returns,
in particular, the Ricardian Equivalence approach suggests that new information on
the value of outstanding debt should have no effect on asset returns.
87
Plosser (1982) tests these issues in a model vvhich attempts to provide measures of
unexpected changes in government spending and money creation, which may affect
asset return. Using quarterly data of holding period returns t over the period 1954.1 and
1978.IV (with gaps due to unavailability of data), Plosser found consistent evidence
that innovations in government purchases are negatively related to excess returns.
This implies that the positive innovations in government purchases (debt) are
associated with higher interest rates, and this finding is in line with Neoclassical
theory. Plossert howevert also finds that the two financing variables are individually
insignificant t in line will the Ricardian Equivalence approach. Plossert therefore t
concludes that there is little evidence to support the view that the way in which
government finances its expenditures is systematically related to movements in rates
of return t although there is consistent evidence that innovations in government
purchases are negatively related to excess returns.
Seater (1993), argues that the majority of interest rate tests have results that are
clearly inconsistent with the traditional view that government debt is positively related
to interest rates. These tests are t howevert also not entirely consistent with the
Ricardian view, vvhich implies a 'neutral' effect t and not the negative one often found.
Seater (p. 176) provides a possible explanation for these negative results in these
tests.
i.) The impact of uncertainty about the future debt burden is not included in the
regressors. Furthermore, Seater (p. 176) points out that the omittance of marginal tax
rates from these studies may result in an omitted variable bias, as there tends to be
a positive relationship between the pre-tax interest rate and the marginal tax rate.
Furthermore, a negative relationship is present between the marginal tax rate and the
level of the budget deficit. Consequently, a higher bUdget deficit may be related to a
lower rate of interest via a reduction in the marginal tax rate, whether the Ricardian
Equivalence approach is indeed valid or not. It needs to be noted however, that Evans
(1987) includes marginal tax rates in his analysis and his initial findings were
unchanged.
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iL) Interest rate tests often ignore the fact that most of the economies they are
analysing are small and relatively open. In the economies of these countries one finds
that interest rates are primarily determined by the inflow of foreign capital and, when
deficits are financed via foreign borrowing in these circumstances, one finds that it will
be the current account and not the domestic interest rates that will be effected.
Consequently, one must not interpret the stability of interest rates in these
circumstances as an indication of the existence of the Ricardian Equivalence
approach. Seater (p. 176) points out that despite this consideration, one can still test
for the existence of the Ricardian Equivalence approach, in that should there be a net
inflow into a country and, the domestic currency appreciates, one will expect there to
be a positive relationship betvJeen the deficit and the exchange rate and the Ricardian
Equivalence approach in such circumstances will be invalidated. Evans examines this
issue and, finds that there is no association between the level of the budget deficit
and the external value of the domestic currency and, the Ricardian Equivalence
approach therefore appears to be authenticated by Evans's findings.
3. Real world experiments
In order to provide a comprehensive overview of the aggregate evidence on the
Ricardian EqUivalence approach one needs to include a discussion on what are often
termed 'natural experiments'. These 'natural experiments' are often preferred to the
more formal, constructed analyses as they tend to eliminate many of the identification
problems inherent in the other types of studies. The so called 'Reagan Deficit
Experiment' of the 1980's is one such stUdy. This study is considered by many to be
indisputable evidence that, despite its theoretical appeal the Ricardian Equivalence
approach clearly fails to explain reality.
A. The Reagan Experiment. This study works as follows. Firstly, in the 1980's the
United States deficit was permitted to go well above its usual level, this was
significant as it was a relatively peaceful period, which suggests that the increased
deficit was not due to the increased expenditure requirements of government, often
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associated with war time. Consequently, this period is often regarded as a 'natural'
experiment on the effects of deficit financing as there were no distorting factors, such
as war, in play. Having ascertained that this was a suitable period for analysis, it is
found that, the behaviour of consumption, interest rates, saving and the balance of
payments changed in ways inconsistent with Ricardian predictions. Despite its appeal,
this 'experiment' is by no means regarded as a conclusive invalidation of the Ricardian
Equivalence approach.
This argument and its findings have been criticised on various grounds. Firstly, that
the sample period of ten years is generally regarded as a too short a period for
analysis, as it only yields 10 sample points and, consequently, any statistical
inference made on such a small sample should be considered with great caution
(Seater, 1993). Secondly, even though there appears to be a correlation between
budget deficits and other macroeconomic phenomena, this association however, does
not automatically infer that the budget deficit can explain changes in these variables,
or that there is a causal relationship between them (that is, this analysis appears to
have failed to take account of the post ad hoc fallacy). Thirdly, this study does not
include all the relevant variables (for example, government transfers, marginal tax
rates, the money growth rate) vvhich could have a profound impact on the results - that
is to say, this 'experiment' tends to omit potentially significant variables. Finally, the
presence of potential errors of measurement, for example, the decision to use
national income accounting measures is not always the best or the most accurate
option. Seater points out that the measure of savings used in this 'experiment' may
have significantly influenced the findings.
Seater is of the opinion that, if one takes the above mentioned criticisms into account,
and reexamines the 1980's experiment, one would, in general, find substantial support
for the Ricardian Equivalence approach.
B. The 1990's experiment. Another example of a 'natural experiment' occurs in the
1990's. In 1992 a tax policy founded on a new rationale was introduced in the United
States. This change was motivated by a need to deal with a persistent recession, the
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idea being to stimulate aggregate demand and, this was to be achieved via a
reduction in income tax rates, thereby providing workers with increased take-home
pay. This effect was dampened by higher tax payments in 1993. This meant that
despite the tax reduction in 1992, \I\Orkers in 1993 were still expected to pay the same
amount of tax as they did previously. A survey was also undertaken to find out what
economic agents 'NOuld have done with the increased income made available by the
change in tax policy. The results of this survey are very interesting in that, 43% of the
respondents said that they would use it to increase consumption, this behaviour is in
line 'Nith the Keynesian view. The other 57°k said that they would save it or use it to
repay debts, thereby reversing the wealth effect induced by the change in tax policy
and this provides further substantiation to the Ricardian claim that economic agents
will discount higher future tax liabilities inherent in a current debt for tax
swop.(Shapiro and Slemrod, 1993). The results of this survey appear to indicate that
perhaps both views have merit. It must be pointed out though, that the findings of this
study may be tilted in favour of the Ricardian Equivalence approach, because of the
close proximity of the future tax liability in this study. If economic agents had expected
the tax increase (implied by the current tax cut) to occur 20 years after the original tax
cut, then economic agents may not have been as motivated to save the extra income
and, the traditional view will therefore, tend to be ratified (Mankiwand Scarth,1995).
c. The Israeli experiment • Barro (1993) makes use of Israel (the period 1983 and
1987) as a 'natural experiment' for studying the interplay between budget deficits and
saving. Barro finds that the graph of the private and public savings rates plotted over
time, shows that they are mirror images of each other - in other words, he finds that
there is an inverse relationship bel'Neen them. For example, Barro finds that, in 1983
the private savings rate was 17% and the public savings rate was - 4% (the national
savings rate was 13%). When the budget deficit grew substantially in 1984, the pubtic
savings rate was - 11 %, and private savings rose to 26% (and, the national savings
level grew to 15%). The Ricardian Equivalence approach would forecast that national
saving \I\Ould remain unaltered over this period. Barro finds that this was not quite the
situation in Israel. One can hOVJever, say that the fluctuations in national saving were
relatively smaller than those of public and private saving. This study clearly does not
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furnish unquestionable evidence in favour of the Ricardian Equivalence approach. It
does however, suggest an almost one-to-one offset between public and private
saving. More convincing results may emerge if the study is extended over a longer
period of time.
4. Studies using Microeconomic Data
Micro data studies attempt to examine the effect that debt or the deficit has on
household behaviour. What is of importance to the existence of the Ricardian
Equivalence approach is that individual households perceive the future higher taxes
that the increase in the aggregate stock of debt implies for it. The evidence in this
area is rather inconclusive as micro data studies have been hampered by the fact that
the existing micro data does not allow for the extraction of the pertinent information.
One approach to using micro data has been to examine the effect of Social Security
benefits on individual saving. The existence of the Ricardian Equivalence approach
would require that an increase in Social Security benefits (financed only by an
increased deficit) should lead to an increase in bequeathable assets because an
increase in Social Security benefits implies a transfer from the young generation to
the old generation. The Ricardian Equivalence approach \YOuld require that the old
generation will want to annul this situation, so as to maintain the young generations
attainable utility, by transferring this increased wealth back to its descendants. This
would be achieved via increased bequests. The data has shown some behaviour
consistent with the Ricardian Equivalence approach, but also some that is not.
These types of studies and their ability to resolve the Ricardian Equivalence issue are
often questioned, in that they often suffer from uncertainty and adverse selection
problems (Seater, 1993). A further problem with such studies is the fact that it is often
impossible to disentangle the insurance aspect of Social Security (which
unambiguously reduces saving irrespective of the existence of the Ricardian
Equivalence approach) from the vvealth aspect, which is the integral part in testing the
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existence of the Ricardian Equivalence approach.
One Social Security study that does not suffer from the insurance problem is that of
Kottikoff (1979) and (Seater, 1993). Kotlikoff examines the response of household net
mrth to variations in lifetime wealth increment 51-elated to Social Security, and finds
statistical support for the Ricardian Equivalence approach. This suggests that
preretirement asset holdings do not increase with an increase in the life time wealth
increment related to increased Social Security Benefits. In fact Kotlikoff (1979) finds
that the assets holdings for post retirement households rose one-for-one with the
increase in the life time wealth increment.
4.4 Conclusion
On the whole, the direct evidence appears to support the Ricardian Equivalence
approach, but the indirect evidence does not appear to lend much support to the
Ricardian view. Consumption function studies essentially always favour the Ricardian
Equivalence approach. Some of the interest rate tests also validate the Ricardian
Equivalence approach, as do the real \NOrld experiments and tests on exchange rates.
The evidence from micro data is, however, inconclusive due in part to the inherent
problems associated with this type of analysis.
51 The life time wealth increment is the present value of future Socia~
Security benefits less the present value of future Social Security taxes
less the accumulated value of past Social Security taxes paid.
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CHAPTER FIVE
AN EMElRICAL TEST OF THE BICARDIAN EQUIVALENCE
5.1 Introduction
The Dalamagas (1994) study provides an interesting and innovative method to test
for the existence of the Ricardian Equivalence theorem, in both developed and less
developed countries. Dalamagas' astonishing findings, that consumers in the South
African economy behave in a manner consistent with the Ricardian Equivalence
approach, prompts one to question whether his findings are indeed accurate. This
_ chapter, in response to this concern, replicates his study, but before doing so, the
Dalamagas' article will be closely examined.
The Ricardian Approach
The central proposition of the Ricardian Equivalence approach is that, whether
government finances a given path of expenditure with increased current taxation or
via the sale or govemment bonds is inconsequential since they exert the same effects
on the economy.
Such an 'equivalence' is seen to arise because government borrowing tends to
increase the anticipated future tax liabilities of economic agents, who being rational,
will tend to anticipate the need for increased taxation in the future. Furthermore, if
they anticipate that these taxes will be levied at a level sufficient enough to cover the
interest that has accumulated as well as to repay the principal, then there will be a
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strong incentive for economic agents to react to anticipated future taxes in the same
way as current taxes. Consequently, if economic agents discount the future tax
liabilities implicit in the provision of new public debt, then the current period's tax
reduction will be used to increase private saving such that the implied future taxes can
be repaid. Consequently, government debt will be absorbed without any real effects
on economic activity, and private sector net 'Nealth and permanent consumption will
be unchanged. This will also be the case if increased government expenditure is
financed via increased taxation hence, there is seen to be an 'equivalent' effect. This
increased current taxation will also have no impact on economic variables in the
economy.
Even though the Ricardian view may not, in reality, hold exactly as Ricardian
economists contend (due in part to the restrictive assumptions often required for its
operation) elements of truth in the approach have sanctioned a large body of empirical
work on modelling and testing the Ricardian Equivalence approach.
Empirical Research
The general method of the initial aggregate consumption function studies has been
to include govemment variables in a regression of private consumption on income and
wealth. This is to test whether the alternative methods of financing a given path of
govemment expenditure (taxation, govemment debt, money creatjon), exert the same
effects on private consumption. The results of a number of these tests are analysed
by examining the changes in the levels of private consumption. In employing this
technique, the assumptions of the Ricardian Equivalence approach are not explicitly
tested. The anticipated fiscal variables and expectations behaviour are not explicitly
incorporated. This method therefore is believed to have serious shortcomings as it
does not incorporate expectations about future behaviour. It is on these grounds that
a new approach to testing the Ricardian Equivalence proposition was founded.
The more recent approach tests the Ricardian view in the context of a dynamic
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optimizing of consumer behaviour. This method attempts to explicitly test the key
assumptions of the Ricardian view. HO'NSver, a number of critical variables have also
been dropped out from the analysis in an attempt to simplify the process of conducting
the relative tests.
Empirical Evidence
The results from econometric studies into the validity of the Ricardian view have been
varied and often inconclusive (as is shown in Chapter 4 of this thesis). One can.
hQ\Never, draw the conclusion that many of the findings did not resemble those implied
by the traditional analyses of fiscal policy, which requires that a loan budget deficit
raise interest rates, 'crowd-out' investment and worsen the balance of payments
position.
The justifications often mentioned for such divergent results from the various
econometric studies are differences in the databases used, the specification of the
consumption function and the definitions of variables (for example, income, debt)
employed in these studies. Dalamagas points out that minor changes in the empirical
models have resulted in radically different findings. Dalamagas argues that the most
significant flaw in the majority of these studies has been the fact that they are based
on the assumption that the underlying data processes are stationary52 despite the
manifest non-stationarity of most aggregate time series. Dalamagas also believes that
many of the studies have failed to take account of the importance of the debt to
tncome ratios in the countries under analysis. He believes that this could possibly be
a mitigating factor behind the divergent findings.
Recent studies undertaken by Vaughn and Wagner (1992) and Dalamagas (1994)
52 A time series (xJ will be stationary when its mean, E(Xt) is independent of
its time period (t), its variance E[Xt - E(Xt)]2 has a set boundary and does
not vary systematically with time. Thus, a stationary data set will tend to
return to the mean and fluctuate around it within a certain range
(Kennedy, 1995).
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attempt to reconcile the diverse findings of the various studies by employing a
modified version of the 'fiscal illusion' concept53. In particular Dalamagas utilizes the
'income-ta-debt ratio' for revising the methods of testing the Ricardian Equivalence
approach, and by so doing has provided additional and more conclusive empirical
evidence into the validity of the Ricardian view.
The findings of the most recent studies have sparked renewed debate in the
evaluation of the potency of fiscal policy. Consequently, in an evaluation of the validity
of the Ricardian view, a comprehensive review of Dalamagas' (1994) study is
therefore included in this thesis. His article is also of particular importance to this
thesis as it includes South Africa as a sample country.
5.2 The Dalamagas (1994) Model
Dalamagas, in testing whether the method of financing a given path of government
expenditure has the effects on real economic variables implied by the traditional view
or those implied by the Ricardian Equivalence approach, develops an empirical
version of the Modigliani-Sterling (1986) model (which adopts the dynamic54
optimizing approach). Dalamagas opts for Modiglaini and Sterling's model as he
believes it incorporates the appropriate specification of variables so as to bring out
the implications of the Ricardian Equivalence proposition. The Ricardian position is
that financing implies future taxes (with a present value equal to the value of the debt)
and rational agents will completely discount the implied higher future taxes, and,
consequently, deficit financing will have no real effect on economic activity.
Comparing this with the traditional view, which postulates that economic activity is
influenced by a bond-financed deficit, they argue that there are negative effects on
53
54
The traditional fiscal illusion concept suggests that individuals do not
clearly perceive important fiscal variables due to the costs (for example,
time and effort) involved in obtaining accurate information on each
individuals tax burden.
Dynamic optimisation suggests that economic agents make their optimal
decisions which incorporate expectations about the future.
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private consumption associated with taxes. There are also positive effects on private
consumption/spending associated with the temporary distribution of public debt.
The Modigliani-Sterling model (1986) relies on Franco Modigliani's Life-Cycle
Hypothesis to derive an aggregate consumption function which shows explicitly how
govemment expenditure and taxes should affect private consumption. The derivation
used by Modiglaini-Sterling attempts to bring out the observable implications of the
Ricardian view, 'Nhich are shown to be equivalent to a limiting form of the Life-Cycle
Hypothesis in which the planning horizon is infinite. This finding is not entirely
surprising when one considers the fact that if the planning horizon is finite, and the
higher future tax liabilities (implied by the current debt for tax swop) are not to be
levied within the relevant planning horizon, then public debt will tend to have positive
wealth effects, as economic agents will consume the extra income provided by the
current debt for tax swop55.
Initially, in the process of deriving an aggregate consumption function capable of
showing explicitly how fiscal variables should affect private spending, Dalamagas
uses an aggregate consumption function,56 which is based on the traditional view, that






= before tax domestic product;
= tax revenue;
=the marginal propensity to consume;
Although Barro (1974) did show that should economic agents be
concemed about the future welfare of their descendants (and therefore,
make positive bequests), then finite planning horizons are no impediment
to the operation of the Ricardian Equivalence.
Based on Modigliani and Sterling's (p. 1168) specification.
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After-tax income, is discounted at rate r, such that 6 = 1(I+r) - and therefore, equals
the present value of anticipated after-tax labour income.
Equation (34) appears to support the traditional view that consumption only depends
on taxes (Modigliani and Sterling p. 1168). But, this model which aims to test the
Ricardian Equivalence (using the Life-Cycle hypothesis), would require that the
relevant taxes are future as well as current. This is the case since, the Life-Cycle
hypothesis (like the Ricardian view) assumes that the representative economic agent
is 'forward-looking' in regard to the fiscal affairs of govemment and, that the
economic agent will perceive the higher future tax obligations implied by the current
debt for tax svvop. This belief is important as it implies that economic agents base
their consumption decisions on lifetime income, which depends on the present value
of government expenditure, and not the timing of tax collections.
In order to show that consumption depends on taxes as well as expenditure one has
to consider the government's intertemporal budget constraint. This budget constraint
requires that expenditure cannot exceed the sources of revenue and can be written
as:
(35)
Which can be rewritten as:
(36)
Where:
~ =total government expenditure on goods and services;
Dt =the budget deficit;
Tt =tax revenue.
If it is further assumed that, if the representative economic agent takes into
consideration the benefits to be derived from the future provision of goods and
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services by the government, then the private and public sectors can be integrated by
combining the government and representative agents budget constraints, as done
in the next paragraph.
Dalamagas proceeds to substitute (36) (the government's intertemporal budget
constraint) into Equation (34) to obtain a relationship where consumption depends
on the expected levels of income, total government spending and the fiscal deficit
(taxes are embedded in equation (37»). Seater (1993) would question the validity of
the decision to eliminate the tax variable from equation (37), as marginal tax rates
should be included because of their effects on the relative rates of return, given that
they are highly correlated with average rates of return and therefore, total tax
revenue. Dalamagas, however, does correct this omission, later in his study. The
relevance of this will be discussed latter in this section.
Consequently, by substituting equation (36) into (34), the analog of the specification
of Modigliani and Sterling's consumption function (Equation 5 in their analysis) is the
following:
00 00 00
C - L Stiy L StiG L StiDt-a1. ·u t+1 +a:z. ·u t+1 +Q3. u t+1
1=0 1=0 1=0
(37)
From this it can be seen that consumption is determined by the expected levels of
income, government spending and the fiscal deficit. Dalamagas revises this
consumption function to include anticipated57 values by estimating Equation (37) in
t'NO different stages, the first stage, the predicted values of E t - 1Yt, Et _1Gt and E t-1
Dt are generated by running an ordinary least square test of (~ , ~ , Q ) on itself
lagged one or more periods and on the price level, the monetary base and the
govemment bond yields with various lags. In the second stage, the values of E t - 1Y t
, Et _1G t and G-1 Q are also forecast. The final specification of the consumption
57 Anticipated and expected forecasts of variables are qualitatively identical,
what these terms highlight is that one is dealing with future values.
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=private consumption in period t;
= is the expectations operator;
=expected before tax gross domestic income;
=expected government spending;
::: expected budget deficit.
Dalamagas specification of the consumption function (equation (38», suggests that
current consumption (Ct ) will be determined by the expected value of future income,
government spending and the budget deficit, (the budget deficit is included to
analyse whether consumption responds to W'ealth in the form of government bonds
or not). Expectations in this model are formulated as follows: for example, the
expectation of Dts is made in this period (t-1) of Dt in the next period t.
Results favourable to the Ricardian view or the traditional view will imply the
following about the coefficients of the relevant variables:
(i) The traditional view of fiscal policy contends that all government expenditures
regardless of their use or method of financing, tend to expand aggregate demand.
This is so because, the level of planned private consumption will rise when current
taxation levels are decreased, which occurs when government runs a bond-financed
budget deficit. The traditional view argues that the expansionary effects associated
with the issue of public debt is a result of the stock of government debt, in private
hands, being perceived as an addition to net private wealth. They argue that, since
households are unable to perceive the future tax implications of a current expansion
in the public sector borrowing requirement, they will view the current tax cut as a
permanent increase in net wealth, and hence will increase desired consumption
expenditure in accordance with this increase in net wealth, so that a3 will
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consequently be a3 > 0 (~ is the proportion by which private consumption will
increase with an increase in expected public debt).
(ii) Alternatively, the Ricardian Equivalence approach maintains that 'Nhether a given
path of govemment expenditure is financed by a debt or by taxation is irrelevant as
in both instances there will be no real effect on aggregate demand. The Ricardian
view is based on the assumption that debt financing, in the private sector's
perceptions, is only a shift in the timing of tax collections and as such leaves
household wealth and consumption unchanged. Consequently, if government runs
a bond-financed budget deficit in the current period, economic agents will merely
increase current saving, (so as to adjust the bequest provision such that the well-
being of future generations is protected) and there will consequently be no impact
on current aggregate demand so that in this case a3 =058.
(iii) Therefore, on the expenditure side, the Ricardian view would argue that private
consumption will decrease in accordance with the nature of the increase in
government spending. If government spending is on consumption-type goods, which
are substitutes for private goods (as is assumed in this model) then the reduction in
private consumption will be large, so that -1 ~ a2 < 0 (a2 is the proportion by which
private consumption will increase with an increase in expected government
spending). This assumption that government expenditure is primarily on
consumption-type goods is significant because, if government expenditure was
primarily on investment-type goods then the return on that investment will be an
additional source of funds which could be used to repay the debt at a later date,
thereby reducing the future tax liability of economic agents. If, however, government
expenditure is primarily on consumption-type goods this will not be the case,
because there is no extra return, and economic agents will be required to repay the
entire higher future tax liability implied by the current debt for tax swop.
58 McGrath's (1979) study indicates that due to the unequal distribution of
income in South Africa one should have some reservations as to whether
a3 will be greater than zero in the South African economy as predicted by
the Ricardian view.
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iv.)On the other hand, the form that government outlays should take, should have
either a small or no effect on consumption spending, so that a2 ~ 0 under traditional
theory. This is so because, economic agents are not seen to perceive the higher
future tax liabilities implied by the current debt for tax swop. Consequently, whatever
impact government expenditure will have on the value of anticipated future taxes is
inconsequential59.
Dalamagas' (1994) Empirical Results
Dalamagas estimates the aggregate consumption function specified in equation (37),
(in particular the parameters of a2 and ~ in the consumption function), for six
countries - Italy, South Africa, Canada, Australia, Korea and Finland. Dalamagas
chose this sample of countries (apart from the data considerations) with a desire to
maintain a geographical balance as well as to obtain a sample that would be
representative of countries with varying income to debt ratios. The sample countries
can, consequently, be grouped into two broad categories - at one extreme the
countries with a low ratio of debt to GDP (Korea, Australia, Finland), and at the other
the countries with a high ratio of debt to GOP (South Africa, Italy and Canada).
Dalamagas' data was drawn from the quarterly National Income Accounts (DEeD)
and the International Financial Statistics (IFS) and covered various time periods60.
Dalamagas finds that the fiscal variables of Finland, Korea and Australia - which are
countries already grouped together as countries with a low debt to GDP ratio - share
59
60
Also on the basis of McGrath's (1979) study one should have some
reservations about the Ricardian view which predicts that economic
agents will be optimizes in the South African economy.
The primary data series are : - gross domestic product, private
consumption, budget deficit, government expenditure, government
revenue, consumer price index, government bond yield, the monetary
base and public debt.
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a number of common characteristics those being:
(i) Increases in the expected budget deficit, Et _10t' in these countries exerts a
significant positive effect on consumption, so that a3 > O. Specifically, Australia
(0,21 )61, Korea (0,33) and Finland (0,37).
(ii) Increases in govemment spending on goods and services, Et _1Gt, had essentially
no effect on consumption (in the cases of Finland (-0,04) and Korea (0,001)) but had
a significant positive effect on consumption in Australia (0,41) therefore, a2 ~ O.
Dalamagas finds the coefficients of the fiscal variables for Italy, South Africa and
Canada ('h'hich are grouped together as countries with a high debt to GOP ratios) to
be different to those in the first grouping. In particular,
(i) Increases in the expected budget deficit, ~ _10t, in these countries has a
significant and negative effect on consumption (Italy (-0.38), South Africa (-0.31) and
Canada (-0.43» implying that a current tax-cut balanced by a tax increase on the
next generation reduces current private spending/consumption in these countries.
(ii) Oalamagas also finds that government spending is adequately valued by the
private sector, specifically, the coefficients for a2 were Italy (-0.02), South Africa
(0.11), and Canada (-0.08) respectively.
An interpretation of Dalamagas' (1994) results
Dalamagas' estimation results for the low indebted countries show that increases in
the expected budget deficit, Et _ 10t, exerts a significant positive effect on
consumption, such that a3 > O. And, increases in govemment spending on goods and
61 The results quoted, are the estimations from Dalamagas' (p. 1203)
augmented consumption function (where the average tax rate has been
included in the regressors so as to eliminate any omitted variable bias).
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services, Et -1 Gh had essentially no effect on consumption, therefore a2 ~ O.
These findings tare consistent with the traditional view that an increase in
government debt is perceived by the private sector as an increase in net wealth. The
private sector is seen to be too myopic to correctly perceive the higher future tax
liability implied by the current debt for tax s~p. Consequently, an increase in current
consumption will coincide with the increase in their net worth.
Dalamagas' finding for the group of highly indebted countries is that government
spending is adequately valued by the private sector. The coefficients for a2 are
roughly zero. This suggests that there is a negative (although insignificant) effect on
consumption with an increase in the expected budget deficit, a3 < O.
This finding firstly, invalidates the traditional view. However, it is at the same time
insufficient evidence to validate the Ricardian view conclusively. This is because the
Ricardian Equivalence approach predicts that a current tax-cut matched by a rise in
national debt, which will be serviced by taxes on future generations, does not change
the opportunity set of current economic agents. The reason for this is that economic
agents feel 'altruistically' towards their descendants, and will increase the
bequeathed amount via increased current saving when govemment runs a bond-
financed budget deficit, so as to ensure the future well-being of their descendants
is not jeopardized. Consequently, the coefficient on deficit should be statistically no
different to zero, as there is a neutral effect. The findings, although not positive, are
also not neutral as suggested by the Ricardian Equivalence approach(as they are
slightly negative). Kormendi (1983), however, provides a possible solution to this
dilemma, which tends to reaffirm the Ricardian view. He points out that a negative
effect of government debt on consumption (as is the finding by Dalamagas for highly
indebted countries) is not at odds with the Ricardian view, because uncertainty about
economic agents share of future taxes, and the timing of those taxes, may induce
economic agents to save more than the present value of the income streams
associated with a bond-financed budget deficit.
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Dalamagas proposes the following explanation to account for such varied results
between low debt to GOP ratio countries and high debt to GOP ratio countries.
Oalamagas posits that economic agents in countries with low debt to income ratios
suffer from 'fiscal illusion', (the notion that economic agents do not take into
consideration the level of government debt when making decisions) and this will
account for them not correctly perceiving the higher future tax cuts implied by the
current tax cut (Dalamagas).
Traditional literature on 'fiscal illusion' proposes that economic agents do not clearly
• perceive important fiscal variables due to the costs involved in obtaining relevant and
accurate information. Three kinds of infonnation costs are usually mentioned:
1. Costs dependent on the degree of visibility of taxes (Oalamagas p. 1203).
The suggestion here is that, the less visible the tax system, the less aware
economic agents will be as to their actual tax burden, and the more they will
have to spend to obtain such information.
2. Costs dependant on the timing of the tax levy (Dalamagas p. 1203). This
refers to the point that, if taxes are paid at long intervals and therefore, in
large amounts, then the more aware are economic agents likely to be as to
their exact burden. If the intervals betvveen tax payments are small, economic
agents will have to spend time or money obtaining that pertinent information,
as the value of their exact burden is less clear.
3. Costs dependent on the degree of complexity of the tax structure (Oalamagas
p. 1203). The idea here is that the more complex the tax structure the higher
the cost of assessing each economic agents real tax burden.
Given that there is often a considerable cost (both financially and in time and effort)
involved in obtaining the relevant information set, which would accurately quantify
the determinants of the representative economic agents actual tax burden, the 'fiscal
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illusion' argument predicts the following:
i.) The representative economic agent is discouraged from obtaining full information
on her total fiscal burden from a tax system characterised either by complexity,
invisibility or timing irregularities, since the marginal benefit of obtaining such
information (that is, the information required by the individual to calculate her actual
tax burden), is far lower than the marginal cost of obtaining such information
(Dalamagas p. 1204).
ii.) The limited flow of information from the tax system to the economic agents will
mean that the economic agent is not able to accurately monitor all existing
government revenue sources or trace out all the tax payments. Individuals in such
circumstances will accordingly tend to underestimate their true individual fiscal
burden (Dalamagas p. 1204).
iii.) Finally, political agents may take advantage of the fact that individuals tend to
underestimate the marginal tax price and push the level of government expenditure
upward to a level higher than an fully informed individual would have normally
preferred (Dalamagas p. 1204).
Hovvever, in order to apply the original 'fiscal iffusion' concept to Dalamagas' analysis
on 'debt illusion' a few modifications need to be made. Firstly, the substitution of debt
for taxes, should not only affect the behaviour of the public sector, (as suggested by
the 'fiscal illusion' concept) but also on private agents. Secondly, the impact of debt
illusion on individual's behaviour cannot be unrelated to the size of the govemment
debt (Marshall, 1991).
Applying the 'fiscal illusion' concept to the current analysis one would expect the
following:
Economic agents in countries with low debt to GDP ratios are less likely to foresee
the future tax liabilities required to service government bonds. This is because
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economic agents in countries with low indebtedness have no particular reason to be
particularly concerned about the way in which fiscal policy is implemented since the
substitution of debt for taxes is interpreted by the economic agent as merely
promoting allocative and distributional objectives without impinging on stabilisation
or growth aspects of the economy. Thus, they perceive a debt-financed budget
deficit, which is an alleviation of their current tax burden, as an increase in net
private vvealth and increase aggregate consumption demand in accordance with the
tax cut. In other words, the representative economic agent (in such circumstances)
is not particularly concerned with appraising the future consequences of incurring
a deficit in the present period, and therefore, does not embark on the often costly
process of gathering accurate information about their real tax burden. This type of
traditional behaviour displayed by economic agents in low indebted countries is also
.not entirely surprising if one recalls that it is consistent with the widely held view that
the act of deluding the taxpayer/voters is the rational action of utility maximizing
political agents attempting to secure their position in office. This highlights the view
that, utility maximizing political agents are likely to adopt policies, (for example, a tax
break) to simulate the economy prior to elections without publishing the true
repercussions of such policies on the fu ure wen-being of the economy, thereby
'fooling' the median voter into believing the economy is in a better situation than it
is in reality, and thus securing votes for their re-election for another term of office.
This account is indeed supported by Dalamagas' findings - economic agents in the
countries with low indebtedness (Finland, Korea and Australia) do appear to operate
under a 'debt-illusion' situation in that there was an increase in consumption
expenditure when a deficit was incurred - this is reflected in the fact that the
coefficient on the deficit was positive, that is a3 > o.
On the other hand, economic agents in countries with high debt to GDP ratios will
tend to foresee the implications of accumulating debt - as economic agents in these
countries tend to be better informed of fiscal constraints under which the economy
is functioning, as there is often a lot of rnedia coverage highlighting the dangers
inherent in the policy of the piling up of public debt. Consequently, economic agents
are aware that such a policy of debt accumulation is likely to have a negative impact
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on their future well-being and therefore, do not increase current consumption in
accordance with the tax cut but take precautionary measures (for example, increase
their levels of savings) so as to ensure that their current standard of living is
sustained in the future. Dalamagas' findings seem to support this view. Economic
agents in countries 'Ntlich are debt ridden are found to even over capitalize (in that,
economic agents tend to save more than the present value of the future taxes
implied by the debt) the higher future tax obligations implied by the current debt for
tax swp, that is a3 < 0 or the coefficient on the deficit was negative.
5.3 Conclusion
Dalamagas' conclusion that the Ricardian predictions, that tax discounting will be
complete, will be ratified in countries with a high debt to income ratio is astounding,
as it is in complete contradiction to the generally held traditional view. Dalamagas'
findings are, if correct, extremely consequential as they suggest that South African
policy makers need not concern themselves with deficit reduction programmes, but
rather to concentrate on policies aimed at correcting the inequalities (in wealth,
distribution of public goods, employment opportunities) created by the Apartheid era.
It is my view that Dalamagas' study and its findings are so significant and
unexpected they warrant replication to reaffirm its accuracy and validity, to this end
Dalamagas' analysis is replicated in this dissertation (see Chapter 7 for the results).
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CHAPTER SIX
TRENDS IN SOUTH AFRICA'S DEeT SITUATION
1972 -1996
6.1 Measuring Deficits and Debt
The manner in which the fiscal deficit is measured has an important bearing on the
macroeconomic implications of deficits. The t'NO key issues here are the composition
of the public sector and the economic relevance of the various types of measures
(Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1993).
The composition of the public sector can be defined in three alternative ways: (i)
central government only; (ii) consolidated non-financial public sector, which adds
provisional and local government, social security and non-financial public
enterprises; and (iii) consolidated total public sector, which adds the central bank
and public corporations. The most accurate measure of a country's fiscal position
usually results from deficit measures based on the most inclusive definitions of the
public sector (Easterly and Schmit-Hebbel). However, there are often technical and
accounting problems and a lack of accurate data, which reduces the usefulness of
the most inclusive definitions.
Public sector deficits and debt can be measured in various ways that are more or
less economically relevant. Conventionally, fiscal deficits are defined as the
difference between total fiscal expenditure and revenue, where fiscal expenditure
includes payments of interest on the stock of public debt (or, in other words, it
measures the accumulated year-on-year fiscal deficit). Public debt, thus, refers to the
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legal obligation of the public sectof32 to redeem and pay interest on specified claims
(bonds) held by domestic or foreign holders against the public sector. The key
concern here is with the cumulative effects that fiscal deficits tend to have on the
stock size of the public debt and hence on the public sector's interest obligations. In
order to isolate the impact current fiscal policy has on the level of public sector
indebtedness, economists often adjust the conventional deficit for interest and
amortisation payments on the public debt. Such a measure of the fiscal deficit, often
referred to as the primary deficit, is believed to provide a more accurate and
informative measure of the real resources absorbed by the public sector.
Many economists have questioned traditional deficit and debt calculations (as
provided by the primary deficit measure) as they believe that they create misleading
impressions of the 'real' fiscal stance. For example, the nominal cash approach
incorporates information which permits broad compatibility across countries. Critics
of traditional deficit and debt calculations argue that this is a more reliable method
as it alloVv'S for a more accurate comparison of the real fiscal stance of countries .
Despite their appeal, these refinements to the standard practice, are seldom
employed, due to their dependence on detailed data which is not often available
(especially in less developed economies). For this reason the definition of the
primary deficit will be utilised whenever measuring or referring to the 'fiscal deficit'
in South Africa.
6.2 Trends In South Africa's Deficit and Debt
Table 1 The ratio's of the Conventional and Primary fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDp63
62
63
That is, central government and all agencies which carry its guarantee.
Consolidated general government including central governments of the
TBVC states, year ending 31 March.
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CONVENTIONAL PRIMARY CONVENTIONAL PRIMARY
1973 3.97 2.87 1984 3.93 1.57
1974 2.01 0.84 1985 3.27 0.53
1975 3.9 2.85 1986 2.55 -0.4
1976 5.10 4.09 1987 3.63 0.45
1977 5.87 4.65 1988 5.16 1.9
1978 5.11 2.91 1989 2.85 -0.42
1979 4.72 3.3 1990 0.59 -3.28
1980 3.00 1.62 1991 4.4 0.62
1981 1.89 0.36 1992 3.38 028
1982 3.17 1.4 1993 8.59 3.89
1983 2.92 0.79 1994 6.4 1.1
Sources: Public Finance Statistics of South Africa 1946-1993
International Financial Statistics
From table 1, it can be seen that throughout the 1980's and 1990's primary deficits
were small (and even in a surplus in certain periods). In the 1995 budget, the
Department of Finance budgeted for a conventional deficit of 5,8% of GDP and a
primary deficit of 0.1 % of GDP for fiscal 1995/1996 (Department of Finance 1995).
It is also evident that the conventional deficit has been rising over the same period.
The growth in the conventional deficit in the 1970's has been attributed to the
increasing level of public debt in the 1970's (as will be shown in Table 2). In the
1980's it is believed that the growth in the conventional deficit was mainly due to
higher interest rates 'Nhich caused interest obligations to become more burdensome.
Since 1993, both a rapid increase in the size of the public debt (this is due in part to
increased expenditure growth and a tax relief in the early 1980s) as well as the
increased burden of service obligatio s has resulted in an ever burgeoning
conventional deficit.
Another important measure, in evaluating South Africa's fiscal stance, has been the
government debt to GDP ratio, (the stock of government debt divided by current
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GOP) as it is generally regarded as an important indication of the long-run capacity
of the economy to carry government debt. Table 2, shows the government domestic
and foreign debtlGDP ratios.
Table 2 Government debt as a percentage of GDp64
DOMESTIC FOREIGN TOTAL66 DOMESl1C FOREIGN TOTAL
1970 39.85 1.77 41.63 1983 31.64 1.52 33.16
1971 39.3 2.92 49.13 1984 30.41 2.2 33.23
1972 40.39 3.12 43.79 1985 28.84 2.22 32.69
1973 35.88 1.81 37.77 1986 30.14 1.74 33.21
1974 30.55 2.08 32.63 1987 32.33 1.38 35.82
1975 33.54 3.23 36.77 1988 32.68 1.21 35.18
1976 35 4.3 39.31 1989 33.88 0.87 39.11
1977 36.97 3.97 40.95 1990 33.79 0.74 38.74
1978 38 2.99 40.99 1991 37.76 0.7 41.93
1979 36.38 1.97 39.35 1992 41.65 0.72 45.05
1980 31.56 0.98 32.55 1993 46.98 0.38 50.81
1981 29.88 1.28 31.16 1994 51.37 1.86 55.42
1982 30.92 1.66 32.23
Source: Public Finance Statistics of South Africa 1946-1993.
International Financial Statistics
South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin, June 1995.
From Table 2, it can be see that, in the 1980's the ratio of public debt to GOP
remained relatively constant around 32 per cent of GDP. But this ratio has increased
dramatically since the early 1990's, from 38,74% in 1990 to 55,42°k in 1994. This
dramatic increase is believed to be largely due to the increased cost of servicing the
64
65
Consolidated central government, year ending 31 December.
Including Gold and Foreign Exchange Contingency Reserve Account
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accumulated stock of public debt in a period of rising interest rates, as well as
borrowing to increase actuarial funding of government pension funds and borrowing
for monetary policy purposes which lead to extra spending. In the 1995/1996 budget,
the Department of Finance forecast interest payments to amount to 18,52% of
government expenditure for fiscal 1995/1996 (Department of Finance, 1995).
Together with the increasing gap between the conventional and primary deficit
shown in Table 1, a larger proportion of tax revenues has been devoted to the
servicing of debt and not to capital expenditures. The current fiscal deficit (defined
as the excess of current expenditure over current revenue) has been used by the
Department of Finance as an indicator of government saving and dissaving. The
level of government saving and dissaving are shown in Table 3.
Table 3 Main Budget (Year ending 31 March) (in millions of Rands)
YEAR CURRENT CURRENT CURRENT CURRENT
EXPENDITURE REVENUE DEFICtree DEFICIT AS 0/0
GDP
1973 2768 3017 -249 -1.3
1974 3417 3859 -442 -1.9
1975 4356 4274 -368 -1.4
1976 5124 5514 -390 -1.3
1977 6153 6104 49 0.1
1978 7196 267 -71 -0.2
1979 7720 8055 -335 -0.7
1980 8902 9597 -695 -1.1
1981 10776 12999 -2223 -3.1
1982 13484 14277 -793 -1
1983 16149 16900 -751 -0.8
1984 19295 18749 546 0.5
1985 24021 22950 1071 0.9
1986 29506 29128 378 0.3
66 The current account deficit is defined as the difference between total
current expenditure and total current revenue.
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1987 36315 32710 3605 2.2
1988 43860 37238 6622 3.3
1989 52577 47862 4715 2
1990 62148 61278 870 0.3
1991 70477 66645 3832 1.2
1992 84113 72049 12064 3.5
Sources: Public Finance Statistics of South Africa 1946- 1993.
South African Reserve Bank Quarterly, June 1995.
What is evident from Table 3, is that until 1983, the current fiscal balance was
generally in a surplus. However, since then, the dominant trend has been towards
increased dissaving of government (from a deficit of 0,5% of GDP in 1984 to 3,5%
of GDP in 1992).
6.3 Conclusion
From the above statistical evidence, it is easy to see why South African economists
are so concerned about the country's future economic prosperity. This concern is
based on the fact that South Africa has a high (and increasing) deficit-to-GDP ratio,
'Nhich it is believed can severety hamper the potential prosperity of an economy. This
concern has resulted in the reduction of the deficit as being one of the foremost
macroeconomic objectives of government. Government has indicated that this
objective is to be achieved via a reprioritization of government expenditure, with
particular emphasis being placed on the 'down sizing' of the public service.
Unfortunately, any reduction in government expenditure will mean that they will no
longer be able to provide all the services that most of its citizens have come to
expect. Furthennore, since the Government of National Unity came into power, there
has been increased pressure placed on them to correct the inequalities created in
the apartheid era. Clearly, this will involve a substantial amount of government
expenditure and, any attempt to reduce South Africa's deficit position may result in
govemment not being able to finance such projects. If government does not embark
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on policies aimed to correct the inequalities from the past, a general feeling of
discontent towards government is may result. This leaves one to question whether
a deficit reduction programme should be embarked at this time? The supporters of
traditional theory 'MJuld argue that a high priority must be placed on deficit reduction,
as a high deficit position will severely jeopardize South Africa's future economic
prosperity. However, supporters of the Ricardian view believe that a high deficit
position will not jeopardize the prosperity of a country and, policy makers in South
Africa could possibly focus on implementing policy to correct the inequalities from
the apartheid era. As will be seen in Chapter 7, it appears that South Africans
behave in a Ricardian manner, the implications for policy makers is however, very
difficult to infer from the econometric results alone:
1. As even though the data reflects the Ricardian Equivalence approach(as will be
seen in Chapter 7 of this dissertation), this does not mean that actual economic
agents behave in this way.
2. The Ricardian Equivalence approach does not take into consideration monetary
factors, 'Nhich clearly caused macroeconomic instability in the South African
economy in the 19805.
3. Finally, policy makers should pay more attention to the perception of agents in
international financial markets, as their opinion of the size of South Africa's deficit




EMPIRICAL ANALySIS : RESULTS AND DIScUSSION.
7.1 Introduction
The results of the replication of the Dalamagas (1994) model are presented and
discussed in this chapter. The fiscal model of Dalamagas 'NaS estimated using South
African quarterly time series data for the period 1972.1 to 1992.3. The computer
package used in estimating the model is MICROFIT version 4.0.
7.2 Data Sources and Reliability
Estimation of the parameters of the aggregate consumption function equation (38)
(on page 100 of this dissertation) required quarterly time series data for gross
domestic product (Y), private consumption (C), the budget deficit (D), government
expenditure (G), government revenue (government expenditure minus the budget
deficit) (T), the consumer price index (P), the government bond yield (r), the
monetary base (MS) and public debt (8).
The quarterly data was obtained from the Intemational Financial Statistics Yearbook
which is published annually by the International Monetary Fund. In this publication,
gross domestic product is line 99b, private consumption, line 96f, the budget deficit,
line 80, govemment expenditure, line 82, government revenue, line 81, consumer
price index, line 64, govemment bond yield, line 61, the monetary base, line 14,
public debt line 88, for the period 1972.1 to 1992.3. The data from this publication
'NaS however, not at constant prices and adjustments were to be made to correct for
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this67. The consumer price index is adjusted such that 1985 is the base year.
7.3 Results of the replication of Da1amagas' (1994) study
The specification of the aggregate consumption function
Dalamagas' specification of the aggregate consumption function to be estimated
(equation 38), incorporates the expected values Et _1Yt , Et -1 Gt , Et -1 Dt , and requires
that the variables (Yt , G t, Dt ) in equation (38) are forecast $0 as to obtain
anticipated68 values (Et - 1Ytr Et - 1Gt and ~-1Dt).
This is achieved by running a ordinary least square test (OLS) of (Ytr Gt, Dt) on itself
lagged one or more periods and on the price level (P), the monetary base (MS) and
the govemment bond yields (r) with various lags. Dalamagas in his article however,
does not indicate how may lags must be used to generate the predicted values
~-1Yt' ~-1~' and Et _1Dt. He does, however, state that the number of lags on each
variable must be chosen so as the residuals are white noise (he does, however, not
give the exact number in his article).
The results form the OLS regressions, ofYt , ~, Dt on itself and on P, MS and r, with
various lags on each variable, show that the optimal number of lags on each
variable, so as to ensure that the residuals are white noise, is k=3. This is so
because, when the number of lags on each variable is k=3, the residuals do not
violate the normality69 criterion. The values of Et -1Yt , Et _1Gt and Et _1Dt generated by




This adjustment could possibly be the source of the slightly divergent
finds of the analysis to those of Dalamagas.
Anticipated and expected forecasts of variables are qualitatively identical.
What these terms highlight is that one is dealing with future values.
The normality test is based on a test of the skewness and kurtosis of the
residuals.
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r each lagged three times), are the forecast values for each variable.




Ct =private consumption in period t;
Et.1 =is the expectations operator;
Et _1Yt =expected before tax gross domestic income;
~.1Gt = expected govemment spending;
Et _1Dt = expected budget deficit.
Dalamagas specification of the aggregate consumption function (equation (38»,
suggests that current consumption (Ct) will be determined by the expected value of
future income, govemment spending and the budget deficit. The alternative expected
values for the parameters (that is, a2 and a3 ) attached to each fiscal policy variable
in equation (38) are discussed in chapter 5.1 (refer to page 100 ).
Having specified the aggregate consumption function (equation (38» to be
estimated, Dalamagas proceeds to estimate it, so as to obtain the values of the
relevant parameters az and a3 in the consumption function. Before proceeding with
our estimation, the stationarity of the data needs to be examined.
Testing for unit roots
Until recently econometricians assumed that time series data was stationaryl but it
has become increasingly clear that most macroeconomic data is non stationary
(Kennedy, 1995 p. 253). It is important to determine whether the data to be analysed
is stationary or non stationaryl since this 'Nil! have a considerable impact on how the
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data must be analysed. Regressions of non stationary data using traditional
econometric analyses tends to result in spurious results (Kennedy p. 253).
Consequently, when one is vvorking with economic time series data it is critical to test
for stationarity before proceeding with the estimation. Unit root tests are used to
determine the order of integration70 of the raw data series (Kennedy p. 253).
Furthermore, a requirement for testing the sets of variables for cointegration71 is to
establish the properties of the individual time series, given that series with
differencing orders of integration cannot be cointegrated (Dalamagas p. 1200).
The series relevant to this study are: private consumption (Ct), expected income
(~-1Yt), expected govemment spending (Et_1Gt ), expected budget deficit (Et _1Dd·
To test the level of integration of the relevant variables 1 the Dickey-Fuller (OF) and
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests are used. The OF and AOF tests for unit
roots are used as they are t-tests that hinge on rejecting the assumption that the data
series is a random walk in favour of stationarity. A negative and significant test points
towards a stationary series (Dalamagas).
The test involves regressing the first differences of the series, for example ~, on its
lagged level and, maybe on a number (p) of lagged differences1 where p is selected
to be large enough to ensure the residual is white noise (Dalamagas). The test
statistic is the t-ratio for the lagged level of the variable. The test statistic has a non-
standard distribution under the null hypothesis that the series contains a unit root.
70
71
If the data is non stationary in levels then the differencing is believed to
create stationarity. Consequently, a data series is said to be integrated
of order d, written I(d), if it must be differenced d times to be made
stationary. When variables are differenced however, short-run
information tends to be lost (Kennedy p. 253).
Variables are co-integrated V\tt1en pairs of non stationary variables can be
expected to wander in such a way that they do not drift too far apart,
consequently, although individually they are 1(1), a particular linear
combination of them is 1(0) (Kennedy p. 254).
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In Table 4, the results of the OF and AOF tests for unit root with trend72 are
presented.
Table 4 The results of the OF and ADF tests for unit root with trend
et ~.1Yt ~.1~ Et.1Dt
Levels 5.3772(-3.4688) -0.94394(-3.4721 ) -1.0445(-3.4721) -11.2528(-3.4721)
First differences -6.3341 (-3.4681) -9.1406(-3.4713) -11.2699(-3.4713)
From table 4 it can be seen that Ct , Et - 1Yt , and ~_1Gt are not stationary in levels but
are stationary in first differences. This is so because, the test statistics for levels are
either positive or negative but not significant, and consequently we cannot reject at
the 5°A> level the assumption that the variables have a unit root. In the case of first
differences, the test statistics are negative and significant, which means that we are
now able to reject at the 5% level the assumption that variables have a unit root. In
the case of the expected deficit, ~_1Dt, however, we have to reject at the 5°/c> level the
assumption that the series has a unit root in levels. Because differencing produces
stationarity we can say that Ct , ~-1Yt , 1;-1~ are integrated series, 1(1), this means
that the series tends to wander widely, but does, however, exhibit smooth behaviour.
It also means that they are random vvalks73 (Kennedy). The expected deficit, Et_10 t , on
the other hand is a stationary series, 1(0) and, this means that the series has a mean
and a tendency to return to the mean, and that it will also tend to display erratic
behaviour (Kennedy p. 254).
The results shown in table 4, are the same as those found by Oalamagas. It is,
however, important to point out that the test statistics are not identical to those of
Oalamagas. This discrepancy in the results may be due to differences in the data sets,
The trended results are used as cointegrated explanatory variables are
usually trended (Kennedy p. 253).
7J Rational expectation theory (for example, the permanent income
hypothesis) suggests that variables (for example, consumption) will follow
a random walk (Kennedy p. 253).
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as Dalamagas adjusts the raw data, and it was very difficult, from his article, to
ascertain exactly how he made the adjustments74.
The results from the OF and ADF unit root tests suggest that the integrated series Ct,
~-1Ytl and ~-1Gt can be cointegrated as they are integrated to the same order, 1(1).
This will mean that the linear combination of them will be 1(0), the parameters of this
combination will be termed the cointegrating vector (Kennedy p. 254). These variables
will, consequently, become the focus of the analysis from this point.
Dalamagas argues that the inferences one can draw from the OF and ADF residual-
based tests are, however, not very reliable and can lead to contradictory results,
especially when there are more than two I(1) variables under consideration.
Furthermore, Dalamagas points out the concern that unit tests are not invariant to
changes in the information set relative to which they are defined, which is significant
as it suggests the multivariate (the OF and ADF are univariate tests) representation
of the data will not necessarily imply as many unit roots as variables. Due to the
fla'NSd nature of these tests Oalamagas opts to employ Johansen's (1998) muttivariate
full information maximum likelihood (FIML) technique to determine the appropriate
cointegrating vectors for the South African data set.
Johansen's full information maximum likelihood technique (FIML)
The Johansen FIML approach, due to the fact that there are more than two variables
under consideration, appears to be a more satisfactory approach to employ as it
provides a unified framework for estimation and testing of cointegrating relations in
the context of a vector autoregression (VAR) error correction model.
Initially, before estimating the likelihood ratio test statistic for the hypothesis that there
are at most r cointegration vectors, one has to determine the lag length of the process:
74 Dalamagas uses seasonal dummies, to eliminate the influence of
seasonal factors on the data.
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~ = n1~1 = + nK~-K + 8 t
75
, 'Nhere Xt is the vector of the 1(1) variables in our model,
they are assumed to follow an autoregressive process with Gaussian errors
(Dalamagas).
Consequently, Dalamagas' first step is to determine the appropriate lags, so as to
select the order of the VAR model. In order to ascertain the relevant lags one starts
for the maximum order (6) of the VAR and 'M)rk down, the results of the VAR test with
an order of 4 is illustrated in table 5.
Table 5 Test Statistics and Choice Criteria for Selecting the Order of the VAR Model
~ Ll AlC sac LR test Adjusted LR test
4 -2530.2 -2602.2 -2685.6
3 -2554.2 -2610.2 -2675.1 CHSQ( 16)= 47.9387 [.000]
36.4334 [.003]
2 -2583.3 -2623.3 -2669.7 CHSQ( 32)= 106.2036 [.000]
80.7148 [.000]
1 -2607.3 -2631.3 -2659.1 CHSQ( 48)= 154.0794 [.000]
117.1003 [.000]
0 -2894.2 -2902.2 -2911.4 CHSQ(64)= 727.8841 [.000]
553.1919 [.000]
On the basis of the results, the Akaike information criterion (AIC) selects an order
0, (this selection is made because order 0 has the highest test statistic (-2.902.2)),
and the Schwarz Baynesian (SBC) selects the order 0, (this selection is made as
order 0 has the highest test statistic (-2911.4)). Given these results the appropriate
number of lags is consequently, k=O. These results therefore, suggest the order 0
must be chosen in the cointegrating VAR analysis.
These results (in table 5) and the conclusions that can be drawn from them, differ
from those of Dalamagas because he finds that the appropriate number of lags for
7S This equation is taken from Johansen's (1988) equation (1).
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South Africa is k=2 whereas, we find it to be k=O. One could possibly resolve this
problem, if one considers the point that the results in table 5 appear to fall into two
separate levels, those in the 2600's and those in the 2900's. If Dalamagas chose
to select a lag depth from the values bunched together in the 2600's then, from the
results in table 5, his decision to choose a lag depth of k=2 can be explained.
Another possible reason for the divergent results is the fact that the data set may
not be the same as that used by Dalamagas. Dalamagas adjusts the raw data (for
example, he uses seasonal dummies) but he does not explicitly explain how he
performed the adjustments and, for this reason, the data sets may be different and
these deviations may account for the slightly different results.
Having chosen the appropriate lag structure (k=2) Dalamagas continues his
analysis by estimating the eigenvalues, the associated normalized eigenvectors and
the values of the likelihood ratio test statistic for the cointegrating vectors.
In order to test whether the variables are cointegrated, one tests the null hypothesis
that the variables are not cointegrated. If the null hypothesis is rejected, we can
move on to the next stage of estimation on the assumption that there exists a
cointegrating relationship between the variables. An order of VAR = 2 is chosen, in
line with Dalamagas' analysis. The results of the VAR cointegration LR tests based
on maximal eigenvalue (or trace) of the stochastic matrix are given in table 6.
Table 6 Cointegration with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trends in the VAR,
Cointegration LR Test Based on Maximal Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix
Null Alternative Statistic 95% Critical Value 90% Critical Value
r = 0 r = 1 75.6180 31.7900 29.1300
r<= 1 r = 2 52.5400 25.4200 23.1000
r<=2 r =3 37.3999 19.2200 17.1800
r<= 3 r =4 7.9925 12.3900 10.5500
********************************************rw********************************************************
r =0 p=1 173.5504 63.0000 59.1600
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r<= 1 r>=2 97.9324 42.3400 39.3400
r<=2 r>=3 45.3924 25.7700 23.0800
r<= 3 r = 4 7.9925 12.3900 10.5500
*****************************************************************************************************
According to the maximum eigenvalue and the trace statistics in table 6, the null
hypothesis of 'no cointegration' (namely, r=O) is rejected (this is so becauseI the test
statistic (75.6180) > than the 95% critical value (37.8600). Having rejected the null
hypothesis (r=0) we test the hypothesis that there is at most one cointegrating
vector (r ~ 1). The results in table 6 show that there are at least 3 statistically
significant cointegrating relations among the variables.
Dalamagas, hO\AJever, finds that there is at most one cointegrating vector. Yet, again
one has to question whether Dalamagas' results are sensitive to the way in which
the data is collected and adjusted.
The three cointegrated eigenvectors normalized with respect to the dependant
variable (which can loosely be viewed as the parameters of the consumption
function (equation (38)) are reported in table 7.
Table 7 The "parameters" of the consumption function
E t-1Yt 0.017776
E t _ 1Gt -1.0000
E t_1Dt -0.78078
The hypothesis that the parameter estimates are not statistically significant was
tested by imposing the restriction that the coefficient on each variable is equal to
zero. The relative LR (an exactly identified structural long-run model) test is
distributed as X 2(V) and the results indicated that the hypothesis of a zero
coefficient is rejected.
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The results in table 6 are the same as those found by Dalamagas, but the actual
test statistics are not the same. Dalamagas finds the coefficients on Et - 1Yt, ~_1Gt'
E t _1Dt are (0.594), (-0.364), (-0.282) respectively.
Since the focus of Dalamagas study is the estimation of a2 (the coefficient on
govemment spending) and a3 (the coefficient on the budget deficit) in the aggregate
consumption function (38), and having replicated his study in order to estimate their
value, one now has to look at what conclusions can be drawn about the potency of
fiscal policy in the South African economy.
From table 6, vve see that increases in the expected bUdget deficit, ~-1Dt , in South
Africa has a negative and significant impact on current consumption, (a3 = -
0.78078). This result suggests that VJhen government runs a bond-financed budget
deficit of one Rand, economic agents will cut current consumption by seventy-eight
cents. This result is extremely significant as it suggests that tax discounting occurs
in the South African economy, thereby, validating the Ricardian view of the
consequences of budget deficits on economies.
The Ricardian view argues that the future tax implications inherent in the current
debt for tax swop will be 'fully' perceived by the private sector and, that current
saving will be increased to allow for the higher anticipated future taxation. Increased
desired private consumption, (Vv'hich is induced by the increased disposable income
made available by the debt for tax swop), will decrease by the full extent of the
increase in public debt, leaving aggregate demand unaffected. The Ricardian view,
therefore, concludes that public debt (in the context of a debt for tax swop) will be
absorbed in the economy without any effect on real economic variables.
Consequently, the Ricardian view predicts a3 =O. Although the result from the
estimation (a3 = -0.78078) are not exactly as the Ricardian view contends (as
economic agents appear to even over capitalize higher future tax obligations
implied by the current debt for tax swop), it is most certainly in contrast to the
prediction of the traditional view that a3 > O. Furthermore, our initial reservations
concerning the role that the distribution of income in South Africa would have on the
126
results that Vlere expected (that is, a3 > 0), appear to have be unfounded (however,
future research might want to attempt to model this concern specifically).
From Table 6, it also appears that government spending is adequately valued by
the private sector, as the value of a2 is -1. This result suggests that when
government runs a bond-financed budget deficit of one Rand, the private sector will
cut their private consumption by one Rand, and consequently the Ricardian view
which predicts -1 ~ a2 < 0 is ratified. The Ricardian view argues that when
government runs a bond-financed budget deficit of one Rand, it has an additional
Rand to spend (since, it is an additional source of revenue). And, if government
expenditure is primarily on consumption-type goods (which have no return, unlike
~
investment-type goods), then economic agents, who are rational and forward-
looking, will cut their own current consumption on these types of goods so as to
ensure that adequate funds are available to repay the higher future tax liability
implied by the current debt for tax svvop. The Ricardian view therefore, predicts that
-1 ~ ~ < O. Consequently, the result that a2 =-1, suggests not only is government
expenditure in South Africa primarily on consumption-type goods, but also that
government spending is adequately valued by the private sector as economic
agents are rational and 'forward-looking' in the South African economy. Again, our
reservations about the role that the distribution of income in the South African
economy appear to have been unfounded.
Conclusion
Dalamagas' findings for South Africa most certainty appear to bear up under
scrutiny. A replication of Dalamagas study has clearly shown that his findings are
indeed correct, and South African consumers most certainly appear to behave in
a Ricardian manner. The findings of a2 =-1 and a3 =-0.78078 imply that economic
agents in South Africa do not suffer fron1 'debt iltusion', as they are well-informed
as to the constraints under which the South African economy is functioning, and
have fully accounted for the prospective nation-wide economic difficulties
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associated with ever increasing debt accumulation. Consequently, the results
suggest that the high deficit position in which South Africa finds itself will not result
in high interest rates, inflation or growing current account deficit, which 'NOuld have
been the case had economic agents suffered from 'debt-illusion' and behaved in
accordance with the traditional view and not fully conceptualised the economic
consequences of increased public debt.
7.4 Summary of major findings
From the replication of the Dalamagas study, we found the following important
findings. Firstly. vve found that consumption, income and government spending are
random walks in the South African economy. Secondly, Dalamagas' unexpected
and surprising results stand up to weak replication as the direction of the statistical
results are the same. Thirdly, there is some evidence that government spending is
adequately valued by the private sector and, furthermore, that some tax discounting




This analysis of the relevance of the Ricardian Equivalence approach, and its ability to
explain and predict the economic impact of budget deficits on economies, has been
extremely intricate, as well as rather complex at times. No clear cut conclusions have,
unfortunately, emerged from this investigation into the Ricardian Equivalence approach. The
investigation has however, resulted in a large array of issues being highlighted and
discussed.
In this dissertation it has been sho\Nl1 that the approach based on the Ricardian Equivalence
approach to be a logically consistent theory. In particular, it has been supported by the
Permanent Income/Life-Cycle Hypothesis and the model of Intertemporal Utility
Maximisation, the Fisher Model. Unfortunately, the operation of the Ricardian Equivalence
approach appears to be dependant on the existence of a number of restrictive assumptions,
(infinite lifetimes, perfect capital markets, lump-sum taxation, altruistic bequests and rational
and forward-looking economic agents), which seem on purely theoretical grounds, to
seriously effect the theory's ability to explain and forecast what impact bond-financed budget
deficits will have on the economies of the world. Despite the Ricardian Equivalence
approach's theoretical shortcomings, it is not necessarily a groundless explanation of the
impact of bond-financed budget deficits on the economies of the world.
Furthermore, it would seem that attempts to assess the relevance of the Ricardian
Equivalence approach as an approximation of reality, have been prone to complications,
particularly in the initial stages of this enquiry. The complications have primarily been
econometric in character, for example : measurement problems, specification problems,
simultaneity and data stationarity. Debate and exchange has resulted in econometric tests
(aggregate consumption function tests, interest rate tests, micro data studies and natural
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experiments) becoming more accurate and comprehensive over time. Recent tests seem to
have eliminated the more obvious pitfalls involved in such studies. What one needs to
emphasize is that it appears that more recant studies tend to support the Ricardian
Equivalence approach. Hovvever, many analysts have reported significantly negative effects
on consumption and interest rates associated with the issue of government debt. This is
significant because it suggests a invalidation of both the Ricardian and the traditional view.
It should be pointed out though, a negative effect is closer to the Ricardian view than the
traditional one. Nevertheless, additional investigation into this subject in order to clearly
understand its relevance is necessary.
The investigation into the validity of the Ricardian Equivalence approach has also inspired
debate on many closely related concerns. For example, the relevance of the Permanent-
Income/Life-Cycle Hypothesis which is based on the work of Franco Modigliani and Milton
Friedman. In addition, the connection betvleen the Ricardian Equivalence approach and, the
Permanent-Income/Life-Cycle Hypothesis which stems from the fact that both approaches
appear to be founded on similar assumptions about the behaviour of consumers (that they
are rational and have long planning horizons) has been investigated. An investigation of the
relevance of these assumptions has been mixed, as some of the findings seem to suggest
that economic agents may suffer from myopia. Such a conclusion tends to call the validity
of the Permanent-lncome/Life-Cycle Hypothesis as a model of consumer behaviour into
question. If one also accepts the connection betvJeen the two approaches, this finding tends
to cast some doubt over the validity of the Ricardian Equivalence approach as well. On the
other hand, some research has tended to ratify the beliefs of the Permanent-Income/Life-
cycle Hypothesis and the Ricardian Equivalence approach: this is the conclusion that
economic agents make decisions in a rational manner and, tend to display at least some
forward-planning in their decision making process.
Investigation has highlighted another interesting point. That is that different countries display
various kinds of consumer behaviour towards the issue of public debt. It is also interesting
to note that research highlights the fact that there may be differing levels of Ricardian
behaviour. The Ricardian Equivalence approach is not an 'all-or-nothing' theory and,
consequently it may provide a true reflection of what happens in reality.
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In conclusion, the empirical evidence for South Africa (which is the focus of this dissertation)
is very informative in that it indicates that the public debt issue is not one that warrants the
fuss and furore it has caused in recent times. The evidence from the replication Dalamagas'
study suggests that economic agents in South Africa behave in a way consistent with that
predicted by the Ricardian Equivalence approach. Dalamagas suggests that the reason for
- -- ----
this is the fact that South Africa is a highly indebted country and therefore, its citizens do not
,
- suffer from 'debt illusion'. It appears that economic agents in South Africa are saving as a
precautionary measure, so as to protect themselves against any loss in prosperity they
believe may result from the highly publicized debt position. It appears therefore, that
economic agents correctly perceive the higher future tax liability inferred by the growing
public debt and, this kind of behaviour is consistent with the Ricardian view.
Dalamagas argues that the 'fiscal illusion' concept is critical to understanding why the
Ricardian Equivalence approach operates in some countries and not in others. Dalamagas
believes that it is a high level of awareness about the debt situation which tends to be the
case in highly indebted countries, which accounts for the near-Ricardian behaviour in these
countries. A counter-argument to Dalamagas' reasoning is that, South Africa is a country
which has"a high level of illiteracy and a high level of poverty. Will poor/iUiterate people in
'---- '
fact adjust their behaviour in accordance with what the media advocates? Therefore, what
is the motivation behind the near-Ricardian behaviour in South Africa? An understanding
------of the South African economy may, however, provide possible answers which reaffirm
Dalamagas' view. In South Africa, those who hold the majority of the wealth have, on
average, an exceptionally high level of education and, therefore is it likely that it will be their
"-
behaviour which is Ricardian and creates the near Ricardian situation in the economy, as
their behaviour will dominate what will happen in the South African economy.
The implications of this study's findings (based on a replication of the Dalamagas study), for
policy makers about what form South Africa's future macroeconomic policy should take, is
unclear as:
1. It is difficult to infer from the econometric results alone.
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2. As even though the data reflects Ricardian behaviour by economic agents in the South
African economy this does not mean actual economic agents behave in this way.
3. The Ricardian Equivalence does not take into consideration monetary factors (which
clearly could have caused macroeconomic instability in the South African economy in the
1980s).
•
4. Policy makers should pay more attention to the perception of agents in international
financial markets, as their opinion of the impact of budget deficits on economies must be
taken into consideration before any policy decision is made.
5. The Ricardian results could be effected by the unequal distribution of income in the South
African economy. This issue however, 'NaS beyond the scope of the question posited by this
dissertation. Our results do not seem to indicate that the unequal distribution of income
effects the Ricardian Equivalence approach(as mentioned in chapter 7) but the impact that
the unequal distribution of income may have on the Ricardian Equivalence approachis
perhaps an interesting topic for future research.
Consequently, although at first glance the debate over the validity of the Ricardian
Equivalence approach appears to be essentially a theoretical one, it is most certainly not the
case. The outcome of this debate could have important practical implications for certain
economies of the world.
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